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The Patent Medium: Toward a Network
Paradigm of the Patent System
Or Cohen-Sasson*
The modern patent system is conceived of as an information
platform; it is evident in the common description of the patent system as a quid-pro-quo bargain: Society grants exclusive rights in
exchange for information published by a patentee. But is there more
to the patent system than merely informing others? Does the patent
system also serve as a communication (and not only information)
platform, namely, as a medium? Based on an interdisciplinary analysis of the patent system’s structure and features through the lenses
of communication studies, this Article suggests that it does. It
demonstrates how the patent system—as a medium—enables players to fulfill various communicative ends, much beyond the obvious
goal of disseminating legal-technological knowledge. This Article
strives to characterize the patent medium, as well as to examine the
implications of portraying the patent space as a medium.
Utilizing the power of communication analysis, this Article uncovers an existing, somewhat implicit communication paradigm of
the patent system as a medium. Although tacit and unofficial, this
paradigm is evident through a critical reading of patent scholarship
and case law. This unspoken communication paradigm resembles
that of a bulletin board: it is linear, straightforward, and focuses on
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the informative value of communication. However, this bulletinboard paradigm does not fully reflect the actual nature of the communication that transpires within the patent medium. After reexamining the patent space—the rules, structure, participants, and practices—this Article offers an alternative, more comprehensive paradigm of the patent medium—the network paradigm. A network, as
opposed to a bulletin board, is a connected, multi-directional, and
multi-player platform, which allows communication for various
ends (including, but not limited to, informing). Instead of viewing
the patent medium statically as a host of informative announcements, the network paradigm suggests a dynamic perspective, considering the patent medium to enable discourse.
Beyond its theoretical contribution, the network paradigm
serves as a powerful explanatory tool, offering profound implications for patent law. Specifically, the network paradigm resolves
current oddities in the patent system; for instance, the network paradigm provides new understandings regarding phenomena in patent
law such as patent pledging, early publication, and the first-to-file
rule—incidents commonly considered enigmatic or only partially
understood. As a tool with theoretical and practical-analytical
value, the network paradigm helps both courts and commentators to
theorize and rationalize patent law.
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INTRODUCTION
Disseminating information is a fundamental function of the patent system,1 as has been acknowledged at least since the eighteenth
century.2 Indeed, rules related to the process of disseminating information comprise a linchpin in current patent law. The informational
1

See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974)) (“The disclosure
required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”); Jeanne C.
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) (“[P]atent disclosure
indirectly stimulates future innovation by revealing the invention’s design so that others
can use it fruitfully when the patent term expires and design around, improve upon, or be
inspired by the invention, even during the patent term.”); Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s
Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 370–71 (2013).
2
See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771, 777 (1995) (discussing
the evolution of specification). See generally Edward Wyndham Hulme, On the History of
the Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L.Q. REV. 280 (1902)
(detecting the emergence of the specification practice in the 1730s).
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function is most evident in the disclosure requirement and patent
claims.3 Hence, it is unsurprising to see extensive literature and case
law on patents’ informational role.4 Scholars, practitioners, and
judges have addressed the information that patents reveal, primarily
through the official, public patent documents and particularly
through the disclosure requirement.
However, the patent system serves beyond merely disseminating
information. For instance, patents can stimulate consumer interest
and unveil future products;5 the patent system can mediate novel
scientific achievements to the public6 and signal commercial or national dominance;7 patents may inform the public about anticipated
changes in daily experiences;8 or contribute to the climate change
discourse.9 These functions and many others suggest that patents,
3

See 35 U.S.C. § 112; Or Cohen-Sasson, A Hidden Technological Assumption in Patent
Law, 22 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 272, 283 (2019) (examining the function of the disclosure
requirement and pointing out an inherent conflict between the disclosure requirement and
big-data-related inventions).
4
See Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1607 (2016) (reviewing
how academic literature grasps the fundamental role of disclosure); Rantanen, supra note
1, at 378–88 (suggesting to view patent disclosure’s doctrinal and theoretical aspects
jointly, in a holistic view). See generally Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010) (offering several measures to transform patent
disclosures to more readable, teaching documents).
5
See, e.g., Henry St. Leger, This Leaked PS5 Patent Gives Us Our Best Look at the
Console Design Yet, TECHRADAR (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/news/thisleaked-ps5-patent-gives-us-our-best-look-at-the-console-design-yet
[https://perma.cc/GH7C-3EQ7].
6
See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Android Will Get an Answer to Apple Airtags. Here’s
How UWB Location Tech Works, CNET (Oct. 12, 2021, 9:40 AM), https://www.cnet.com/
news/apple-built-uwb-into-the-iphone-11-heres-what-you-need-to-know-faq/
[https://perma.cc/H2FR-9RX2].
7
See, e.g., Ariel Cohen, A Breakthrough in American Energy Dominance? U.S. Navy
Patents Compact Fusion Reactor, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2019, 12:37 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/10/30/a-breakthrough-in-american-energydominance-us-navy-patents-compact-fusion-reactor/#748843421070 (last visited Apr. 11,
2022).
8
See, e.g., Saavon Smalls, Recently-Published Patent Suggests Facebook Wants to
Include Ads in DMs, MASHABLE (Aug. 2, 2019), https://mashable.com/video/facebook-dmprivate-ads-patent/ [https://perma.cc/DST4-CTDU].
9
See, e.g., Stephen Kuper, Player Two Has Entered the Game: US Navy Files Fusion
Reactor Patent, DEFENCE CONNECT (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/
key-enablers/5064-player-two-has-entered-the-game-us-navy-files-fusion-reactor-patent
[https://perma.cc/PHE7-PT7R] (reportedly, based on patent information, the United States
Navy pursues and develops clean energy).
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and more generally the patent system, assume more than an informational role; they play a communicative role.
Although somewhat reminiscent of each other, the informational
role and communicative role are not the same.10 The informational
role mainly refers to the patent system’s power to convey technical
knowledge and notify others about legal restrictions due to a patent
issuance. The communicative role refers to use of the patent system
to interact with other players by stimulating, misleading, criticizing,
and endorsing others. Indeed, communication is a superset that includes the process of informing; however, communicating is a substantially more diverse and complex act than merely informing.
Communicating can be highly active, emphasizing not only the
knowledge that parties transmit or acquire, but also the interactions
between parties and the consequences of such engagements.11
In contrast to the vast extant literature about patents’ informational role, their communicative role has been studied only marginally.12 Moreover, within the thin thread discussing patents’ communicative function, most writing has addressed such a function indirectly, lacking a clear theory regarding patent communication (i.e.,
the bundle of various interactions, such as patentee-public or applicant-PTO interactions, within the patent space).13 The term “patent
space” refers to the patent system’s various components, including
its rules, players, common practices, and related phenomena.14
This Article strives to fill this gap with two major steps. First,
this Article exposes an existing, unspoken communication paradigm
of the patent system—the bulletin-board paradigm. Although the
patent system has no official communication paradigm, a close inspection reveals an implicit one. This Article conceptualizes this
10

See HUNTER WHITNEY, DATA INSIGHTS: NEW WAYS TO VISUALIZE AND MAKE SENSE
191 (2012).
11
To elaborate on the informing-communicating distinction, see infra Part IV.A.1.
12
With few notable exceptions, to be discussed later, see generally J. Jonas Anderson,
Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2016); Clark D. Asay, The
Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259 (2016); Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573 (2006); Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
13
See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
14
Such as patent pledging, patent statistics, and patent reviews. For discussion of each
respectively, see infra notes 157–58, 214, 218–19 and accompanying text.
OF DATA

862

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:857

communication paradigm as a bulletin board, because it is an inventor/applicant-centric paradigm15 with a linear trajectory, manifested
chiefly in one-way information dissemination from a patentee to
specific groups. This paradigm focuses on the informational value,
rather than the communicative value, of the medium. The paradigm
emphasizes the public sphere of communication, whereas private
channels (i.e., unpublicized communications) receive insufficient
attention. Moreover, it envisions the patent system as a communication platform with relatively few dominant players and limited freedom on the recipients’ side in terms of communicative power.16 In
short, the bulletin-board paradigm perceives patents as announcements, disregarding the notion that the patent space is a conversation
arena.
Second, instead of the bulletin-board paradigm, this Article offers an alternative communication paradigm—the network paradigm. A network suggests a more diverse and nuanced picture than
a bulletin board. It recognizes more players within the patent space
who are active and influential, acknowledging their diversified communicative power.17 This paradigm presents an active, multi-directional, and continuous communication process rather than the traditional one-way communication pattern. Moreover, in the context of
multi-player communications, the network paradigm acknowledges
intermediaries’ critical role and incorporates them into the theory.
Importantly, the relation between the bulletin-board and network
paradigms is not one of contradiction, but of containment: the network paradigm adopts the bulletin-board paradigm’s insights, such
as the informing function, and offers a more comprehensive

15

I use both ‘inventor’ and ‘applicant’ because an inventor may choose not to submit an
application. Such an action could also constitute a powerful communicative act, like Jonas
Salk who developed the polio vaccine and chose to not patent it. See generally JANE S.
SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN (1990) (reviewing the development of the polio vaccine).
16
Communicative power is the participant’s ability to express themselves and influence
other participants in a given medium.
17
Such as active reading or other trivial and non-trivial ways of communication. See
Elihu Katz et al., Utilization of Mass Communication by the Individual, in THE USES OF
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH 19, 19
(Jay G. Blumler & Elihu Katz eds., 1974); ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL
INFLUENCE 32–33 (1955); BARBARA JOHNSTONE, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 1–31, 128–61 (2d
ed. 2008); DAN LAUGHEY, KEY THEMES IN MEDIA THEORY 23–25 (2007).
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communication model that better describes and explains the patent
space. Thus, the network paradigm does not reject the bulletin-board
paradigm but rather supplements it.
To conduct a comprehensive communication analysis of the patent system, this Article integrates the fundamentals of patent law
and communication studies and offers a systematic, organized paradigm of the patent medium. The patent medium is a hypothetical
apparatus consisting of all communication that transpires—officially and unofficially—in the patent space. Addressing the patent
system as a medium—not solely as an economic-legal instrument—
reveals a new stratum of the patent system: its communicative function. Communication studies point to an intriguing dissimilarity: the
bulletin-board paradigm resembles more basic, meager models of
communication—sender-message-channel-receiver
(“SMCR”)
models or linear models18—that emerged and were commonly used
around the 1960s.19 In contrast, the network paradigm is closer to
the transactional model,20 a later communication model that attained
popularity in modern communication studies due to its ability to fit
various, complex communications.21
Equipped with a new, fine-tuned communication paradigm of
the patent system—namely, the network paradigm—this Article advances an explanatory argument arising from the paradigm: the proposed paradigm enables us to better understand and explain a variety
of practices and legal rules in patent law. The following discussion
elaborates on this argument.
This Article maintains that the network paradigm holds an explanatory power that offers a more comprehensive, thorough, and
18

DAVID K. BERLO, THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY
PRACTICE 30–32 (1960); CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 6–8 (1949).
19
Robert T. Craig, Constructing Theories in Communication Research, in THEORIES
AND MODELS OF COMMUNICATION 39, 47 (Paul Cobley & Peter J. Schulz eds., 2013).
20
See Dean C. Barnlund, A Transactional Model of Communication, in FOUNDATIONS
OF COMMUNICATION THEORY 83, 85 (Kenneth K. Sereno & C. David Mortensen eds.,
1970).
21
The Author noted that there is an inclusion relation between the network paradigm
and the bulletin-board (i.e., the former includes the latter). This relation remains valid also
under the analogy to the linear model and the transactional model, as the linear model is
included in the transactional model.
AND
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accurate understanding of the patent system than the bulletin-board
paradigm. For instance, consider the phenomenon of publishing patent applications before the eighteen-month deadline. Patent law requires publication of a patent application no later than eighteen
months from the earliest filing date.22 The patent law’s traditional
view maintains that publication is against the patentee’s interest,
who prefers secrecy.23 In fact, this is the principal issue patent law
aspires to overcome—incentivizing publication with economic
rights.24 As such, according to the bulletin-board paradigm, applicants are expected to defer publication as much as possible, at least
until the issuance of a patent. However, practice reveals that nearly
half of applicants demand that the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) publish their application earlier.25 Moreover, more than
twenty percent of applicants eligible to opt out of the eighteenmonth deadline choose not to do so.26 These practices pose difficulties within the bulletin-board paradigm.
22

35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (“[T]o induce a
disclosure of it [the invention], Congress has, by its legislation, made in pursuance of the
Constitution, guaranteed to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time . . . .”); Dale L.
Carlson et al., Patent Linchpin for the 21st Century, 45 IDEA 267, 271 (2005) (“Two types
of benefits flow from a patent grant. First and foremost, the information that the society
receives from the disclosure.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123, 126–27 (2006) (“[T]he invention is disclosed instead of being kept a secret.”).
24
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“[The
inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of
its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.”); Asay,
supra note 12, at 270–75 (“[T]raditional patent law theories view these information
disclosures as a sacrifice that an inventor must make in order to obtain the real prize of a
patent: exclusive rights.”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1276 (1995) (describing the balance between exclusive
rights and disclosed information).
25
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.219 (2008). See also Stephen Glaeser & Wayne R. Landsman,
Deterrent Disclosure, 96 ACCT. REV. 291, 291 (2021) (“[W]e find that patent applicants . . .
voluntarily accelerate their patent disclosures.”); John F. Martin, The Myth of the 18-Month
Delay in Publishing Patent Applications, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/03/the-myth-of-the-18-month-delay-in-publishingpatent-applications/id=60185/ [https://perma.cc/YK3B-TCRJ].
26
Approximately twenty-one percent of applicants that had the right to delay publication
beyond the eighteen-month, chose not to do so. This number refers to applicants who file
an application in the United States solely, and not abroad; thus, explaining the non-optingout phenomenon on the basis of a tradeoff with the foreign applications—namely, that
applicants prefer to publish within eighteen months and not bear the heavy sacrifice of
23
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On the other hand, the network paradigm offers a proper explanation of early publication: disseminating information is neither the
patent system’s sole function nor its sole capability. Players, including applicants, use the patent system for other ends, such as expanding collaborations,27 generating buzz,28 and encouraging consumerism.29 The patent system serves not only as a legal platform, but also
as a communication network for conducting discourse. The early
publication practice, which conflicts with the underlying assumptions of the bulletin-board paradigm, coincides with the network
paradigm; publication—and more generally, patent communication—is not (only) a means but an end. Patent communication benefits not only the public but other participants, and in this case, the
applicants themselves.
The early publication case is only one example of the network
paradigm’s inherent potential. This Article cites further examples to
demonstrate how the network paradigm explains various practices
and legal rules in the patent system, which the bulletin-board paradigm either ignores or only partially explains.
However, an important caveat must be noted. Although the bulletin-board paradigm does not fully capture the patent medium’s
multiple functions, one should not discount it entirely. The bulletinboard paradigm stems from a deliberate, primary communicative
goal of the patent system and the most basic function of the patent
medium—to disseminate information.30 However, as a paradigm
that originated from a predetermined goal, the bulletin-board paradigm is constrained by this notion. Resultantly, it does not encompass communication that transpires beyond the information dissemination function. The network paradigm aspires to supplement the
interspace between the pre-planned and the actual communication
of the patent medium by theorizing patent communication more
waiving foreign filing rights—is not a valid account. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213 (2012); Glaeser
& Landsman, supra note 25, at 23–31.
27
See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 573–74 (2015).
28
Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1064–70 (2008).
29
See supra notes 5–6, 8.
30
See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974)); Fromer, supra note
1; Rantanen, supra note 1.
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generally, beyond trivial communication processes. Accordingly,
the network paradigm does not always conflict with the bulletinboard paradigm. The network paradigm provides a broader, more
accurate understanding of the patent system and reveals insights we
would miss or improperly perceive if solely relying upon the bulletin-board paradigm. Nonetheless, the two paradigms coincide in certain instances.
This Article is the product of an interdisciplinary inquiry, relying on two pillars: patent law and communication studies. In integrating the two fields, this Article offers a fresh way to contemplate
and investigate patent law—as a medium.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an introduction
to patents as artifacts of information and communication, as the extant literature grasps this topic. Part II presents the theoretical foundations from communication studies in which this Articles’ arguments are rooted. Specifically, Part II discusses the most common
communication models and describes the gradual steps that communication theorists have made from linear to transactional models.
Part III exposes the current communication paradigm that implicitly
governs patent literature and case law—the bulletin-board paradigm. After describing the bulletin-board paradigm’s communicative features, Part III demonstrates through three sample phenomena—patent pledges, early publication, and the first-to-file rule—
that the bulletin-board paradigm is deficient. Part IV proposes the
legislature adopt a new, alternative communication paradigm of the
patent medium—the network paradigm. This Article outlines the
network paradigm using five communicative elements and elaborates on each through examples from the patent space. The argument
maintains that the network paradigm is more than a mere theoretical
view; it bears forceful explanatory power and thus has practical implications as well. Part IV substantiates the explanatory argument by
applying the network paradigm to the three sample phenomena addressed in Part III. This move underscores the superiority of the network paradigm over the bulletin-board paradigm, thereby further
bolstering the suggestion to adopt the network paradigm. Additionally, Part IV supports the shift from the bulletin-board paradigm to
the network paradigm by presenting a similar, more general transition that took place in communication studies, as Part II explains,
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from linear to transactional models. Finally, it provides a brief conclusion.
I. PATENTS, INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATION
This Part discusses how current literature grasps the ternary interplay of patents-information-communication. Commonly, (modern) patent law is described as a social contract: a patent encompasses a pact between the public and the patentee31 in which the
public bestows the patentee exclusive, fixed-term rights concerning
an invention, and in exchange, the patentee discloses novel, innovative information.32 Therefore, extensive literature has addressed patents as a source of information (i.e., patent information), focusing
on specific types of content or audiences.33 The disclosure requirement is a focal motif in such literature. The disclosure doctrine demands that a patentee describes her invention and its utilization.34
Later, this information becomes public; thus, disclosure is the

31

See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 219 (1832) (“The third section [of the 1793 Act]
requires, as preliminary to a patent, a correct specification . . . in order to give the public,
after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is the
foundation of the power to issue the patent.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Complete disclosure as a precondition to the issuance of a patent is part of
the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly for the inventor as consideration for
full and immediate access by the public when the limited time expires.”); Oren Bracha,
Geniuses and Owners: The Construction of Inventors and the Emergence of American
Intellectual Property, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 369, 380
(Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009).
32
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
33
See generally Annamaria Conti et al., Show Me the Right Stuff: Signals for High‐Tech
Startups, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 341 (2013) (arguing that startups use patents to
attract business angel and venture capital funds); see also Mark D. Janis & Timothy R.
Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 75 (2012); Lisa L. Ouellette, Who
Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECH. 421, 421 (2017) (focusing on the scientific
community as an audience).
34
See 35 U.S.C. § 112; Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (invalidating a patent which was not supported by sufficient written description);
Brenda M. Simon, Patent Cover-Up, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1318 (2011) (“To satisfy the
disclosure requirements for patent protection, an inventor must provide a written
description of the invention and enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention.”).
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primary instrument for disseminating information regarding a patented invention.
The disclosure requirement underscores the patent system’s informational function. Two domains—the scientific-technical and
the legal—comprise the core of patent information scholarship.35
Scientific-technical information relates to a fundamental goal of the
patent system—disseminating new technological information.36
Hence, explaining patents as carriers of scientific-technical information is familiar.37 As utility-oriented documents,38 patents serve,
at least in some fields, as a useful resource both for scientists and
down-stream inventors.39 The question of why scientists and inventors use patent information has various answers: in some cases,
35

See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779,
779 (2011) (discussing the “Janus-like” nature of patent documents as conveying both
technical and legal information and elaborating on the complications it causes).
36
Paul M. Janicke, Patent Disclosure: Some Problems and Current Developments, 53
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3, 3–5 (1971) (“Another obvious objective of the patent system is to get
technical information to the public . . . .”); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 287–88 (1977); Seymore, supra note 4, at 621;
Simon, supra note 34, at 1317.
37
For a similar observation, see generally Jane Kaye et al., Patents and Translational
Research in Genomics, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 739 (2007); Ouellette, supra note 33; K. M.
Saunderson, Patents as a Source of Technical Information, 24 ASLIB PROC. 244 (1974);
Richard D. Walker, Patents as Information—An Unused Resource, 10 IFLA J. 175, 175
(1984); RICHARD D. WALKER, PATENTS AS SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL LITERATURE (1995).
38
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[T]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 101.
39
See Wolfgang Glänzel & Martin Meyer, Patents Cited in the Scientific Literature: An
Exploratory Study of ‘Reverse’ Citation Relations, 58 SCIENTOMETRICS 415, 415 (2003)
(finding that about thirty thousand U.S. patents were cited by scientific research papers
during 1996–2000); Devrim Göktepe-Hulten & Prashanth Mahagaonkar, Inventing and
Patenting Activities of Scientists: In the Expectation of Money or Reputation?, 35 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 401, 401 (2010) (suggesting that scientists use patents to gain reputation). See
also FELIX LIEBESNY ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
PATENT SPECIFICATIONS (1973) (finding that only about six percent of technological
information in UK Patents also exists in non-patent literature; when the information is
available both inside and outside patent documents, patents are usually the first source in
print to include disseminate it); WALKER, supra note 37, at xi–xii, 1–60; Alice Lam, What
Motivates Academic Scientists to Engage in Research Commercialization: ‘Gold’,
‘Ribbon’ or ‘Puzzle’?, 40 RSCH. POL’Y 1354, 1354 (2011); Lisa L. Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546 (2012) (arguing that the
benefits of disclosure are stronger than is generally believed and that patents contain
technical information that is not available elsewhere); Ouellette, supra note 33; Walker,
Patents as Information—an Unused Resource, supra note 37, at 175–77.
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patents contain information not yet published; thus, such information is inaccessible outside the patent system.40 Additionally, patent documents present technical topics in a broad, thorough manner, often more so than other sources.41 Hence, patent documents
facilitate bridging gaps between different disciplines.42
The second domain is that of legal information. Using patent
documents for legal purposes is straightforward: patent documents
describe the scope of a patented invention to inform the public which
actions are excluded and which are available for practice.43 The patent claims,44 when read with the disclosure,45 delineate the patent’s
proper borders.
However, patents can do more than merely inform; one can discern some communicative aspects in the context of the patent system. Only sparse literature has addressed the communicative aspects
of patents, relative to the considerable literature regarding patent information.46 Indeed, informing is a subset of communicating; however, communicating is a much broader and potent activity.47
Merely informing another is basic, low-level communication. As
Sydney Harris observed, “[i]nformation is giving out;

40

See WALKER, supra note 37, at 41 (“[T]he patent specification is the first public
disclosure of such an innovation.”). See generally H. R. Mathys, Patents as a Source of
Information, 4 ASLIB PROC. 69, 73 (1952); Ouellette, supra note 39; P. James Terragno,
Patents as Technical Literature, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PRO. COMMC’N 101, 101–02
(1979) (citing studies that demonstrate that patents contain information that is not disclosed
elsewhere).
41
See LIEBESNY et al., supra note 39; Ouellette, supra note 39; Terragno, supra note 40,
at 101 (“[Patents] are different from journal literature in that they are stand-alone
documents and have a uniformity of presentation.”).
42
See JOHN S. GILMORE ET AL., NASA CR-790, THE CHANNELS OF TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION IN COMMERCIAL FIRMS, AND THE NASA DISSEMINATION PROGRAM 1–2
(1967).
43
See Magsil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). This role is also referred to as commensurability. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW
OF PATENTS 87 (2008).
44
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
45
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he
first paragraph requires that the specification describe the invention set forth in the
claims.”).
46
See Anderson, supra note 12; Asay, supra note 12; Long, supra note 12.
47
See WHITNEY, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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communication is getting through.”48 When informing, one simply
disseminates data in a standardized manner, while in communicating, the emphasis is on active participation in the design, delivery, or interpretation of a message. Put differently, communication
means to engage, not only inform.
Few legal scholars have examined issues regarding patent communication. The following discussion notes some major works consistent with this theme. Clarisa Long’s article, Patent Signals, is
seminal work on patent communication.49 Long offers a perspective
on patents as economic signals. She argues that patents serve as relatively cheap, credible signals.50 She explains the capacity of patents
to deliver economic signals and demonstrates this phenomenon
through economic models.51 Since Long focuses on patents’ potential to convey messages of economic significance, Patent Signals
focuses on the way that patents communicate to economic audiences, such as competitors and investors.52
Using patents as economic signals is fascinating and non-trivial,
as patent documents do not contain detailed financial prospects (e.g.,
a revenue forecast).53 Patents, in and of themselves, do not promise
the commercialization or success of an invention. In fact, many patented inventions are not commercialized.54 Yet, patents are a
48

Id. at 191.
Long, supra note 12.
50
See id. at 625.
51
See id. at 643–64.
52
See id. at 643–58.
53
For a discussion of what an inventor must submit as part of a patent application, see
WALKER, supra note 37, at 176.
54
Robert P. Morgan et al., Patenting and Invention Activity of U.S. Scientists and
Engineers in the Academic Sector: Comparisons with Industry, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 173,
178 (2001) (finding that patents in the industry sector had a commercialization rate of
48.9% and patents in the academic sector had a commercialization rate of 33.5%); Kurt M.
Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology
Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391 (2002) (“[A]pproximately forty to ninety
percent of issued patents are not used or licensed by the patentee.”); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–64 (2010) (arguing, in accordance
with empirical findings, that less than half of all patented product inventions are
commercialized); Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen, Do Patents Matter for
Commercialization?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 431, 436 (2011) (finding that the number of
inventions that were granted a patent and then went on to seek mass production is about
forty-one percent).
49
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common way to communicate economic signals.55 Patents’ signaling function derives from two key aspects. First, patents provide exclusive economic rights, potentially increasing the market value of
patent-owning entities.56 Second, as patents are granted for novel
inventions, they comprise ostensible evidence of innovation.57 The
reported number of owned patents is a clear example: the more patents a patentee holds, the more innovative she is deemed to be.58
Following Long’s article, other, non-legal studies have investigated patents as economic signals. Specifically, scholars inspected
the relations between patents and entities’ market values.59 Patents
increase the price paid during mergers and acquisitions and bankruptcy proceedings, leading to the recognition that patents play a
role in determining and signaling an entity’s market value.60
Within this context, patents’ impact on patentee-investor relationships has been studied intensively. Patent signals improve
chances of securing an investment,61 as can be observed in the

55

See Long, supra note 12, at 643–64.
See IAIN M. COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE 2003
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY C.2 (Oct. 2003); William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee,
Strategic Management of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 157, 158 (2013).
57
See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal
for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing that patents aid patentees in appearing more
innovative); Sharon Belenzon & Andrea Patacconi, Innovation and Firm Value: An
Investigation of the Changing Role of Patents, 1985-2007, 42 RSCH. POL’Y 1496, 1496
(2013) (finding that EPO patents are the dominant indicator of innovative activity).
58
See Bartow, supra note 57, at 8–9 (noting that companies may invest in research and
development with the goal of accumulating patents, generating an appearance of
innovation, and increasing company valuations).
59
See, e.g., Dirk Czarnitzki et al., Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for
Financing Constraints on R&D (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19947,
2014) (studying the effects of firms’ patenting activity on the degree of financing
constraints).
60
See Gregory L. Alexander, Don’t Overlook Patent Damages, 16 AM. BANKER INST. J.
26 (1997); Robert Boyden Lamb, The Role of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets
in Mergers and Acquisitions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 2.1, 2.3–2.5 (Lanning G. Bryer & Melvin Seminsky eds., 2002) (arguing that
firms’ IP has become a major factor in valuing mergers and acquisitions deals).
61
See David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for
Entrepreneurial Ventures, ACAD. MGMT. BEST PAPER PROC. 1, 2 (2006),
56
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relationship between patentees and venture capitals (“VCs”).62 Patent signals in patentee-investor relationships are not constrained to
privately-held companies; a similar signaling capability can be identified in initial public offerings (“IPO”).63 Empirical studies have indicated that patents enhance a company’s reputation before an IPO,
leading to “IPO patents” that lure investors.64 A peculiar phenomenon underscores the signaling quality of patents in IPOs; namely,
that shortly after an IPO’s conclusion, companies that go public
have been known to abandon many of their IPO patents.65
Two other important works, alongside Long’s article, join the
thread of patent communication: The Informational Value of Patents
by Clark Asay66 and Nontechnical Disclosure by Jonas Anderson.67
From a legal perspective, both articles deal with a non-trivial usage
of the patent system—its capability to convey messages beyond the
obvious legal and technical information context. Moreover, both papers build on the groundwork Long set approximately fifteen-years

https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94KS-8SJX] (finding that patents improve the terms by which new firms
access VCs); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000) (arguing that patents may serve other
purposes besides excluding competitors, including improving the chances to secure VCs’
investment); Long, supra note 12, at 637.
62
See Conti et al., supra note 33, at 356; Daniel Hoenig & Joachim Henkel, Quality
Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital
Financing, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 1049, 1050–53 (2015) (finding that patents affect the venture
capitalists’ decision making); Annamaria Conti et al., Patents as Signals for Startup
Financing, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 592, 593 (2013) (demonstrating how startup founders file
for patents to signal invention quality to VCs).
63
See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 28, at 1067.
64
See, e.g., Diego Usech, Are Patents Signals for the IPO Market? An EU-US
Comparison for the Software Industry, 43 RSCH. POL’Y 1299, 1299 (2014) (finding
correlation between patent applications and IPO performance).
65
See Nada Basir et al., The Fate of Patents: An Exploratory Analysis of Patents as IPO
Signals of Reputational Advantage 5 (Royal Inst. of Tech., Ctr. of Excellence for Sci. and
Innovation Stud., Working Paper No. 348, 2014) (finding correlation “between the
likelihood of patents expiring due to lack of maintenance fee payments and the time to
IPO”).
66
Asay, supra note 12; see also Clark D. Asay, The Informational Effects of Patent
Pledges, in PATENT PLEDGES 227 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017).
67
Anderson, supra note 12.
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prior.68 Yet, these works highlight aspects with which Long did not
engage and apply the general idea of signaling theory to concrete
cases in patent law.69
Asay addressed the communicative function in the specific context of patent pledges. In short, “pledging” means waiving patent
rights fully or partially.70 By waiving patent rights, pledgers intend
to deliver various messages about themselves to competitors, investors, and potential partners and employees.71 Asay convincingly argues that it is more credible and beneficial to convey messages by
waiving rights granted by a patent, rather than avoiding the process
of applying for a patent in the first place or relinquishing trade secrets.72
Anderson, on the other hand, focuses not on pledges but on the
disclosure requirement.73 Although Anderson does not explicitly
use the term communication, he contends that patent disclosure is a
way to communicate with investors.74 Anderson expands the term
“investors” to also include consumers, not just shareholders and
VCs who may find interest in a product due to patent disclosure.75
The argument and its result concur with many of the aforementioned
works that discuss the power of patents to attract investors.76 However, while most researchers investigated the topic from an economic perspective, Anderson’s article adds a legal point of view, as
he juxtaposes nontechnical disclosure with the traditional disclosure
doctrine and analyzes the former through a patent theory lens.77

68

See id. at 1592 (“Long signaling theory is a valuable insight . . . .”); Asay, supra note
12, at 265 n.27 (“This Article thus builds on Long’s work while identifying key differences
with it.”).
69
See Asay, supra note 12, at 309–20 (providing an overview of recent Supreme Court
patent decisions, and ramifications for patents as informational tools).
70
Id. at 261.
71
See id. at 286–307.
72
See id. at 282–85.
73
Anderson, supra note 12, at 1577.
74
See id. at 1575.
75
See id.
76
See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
77
See Anderson, supra note 12, at 1599 (discussing the nuances of patent theory and
nontechnical disclosure).
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The works discussed thus far address a specific function of patents—the communicating function—and suggest that patents serve
goals beyond the basic aims of protecting inventions and disseminating information. Such an approach resembles the general notion
underlying this Article. However, there are gaps and deficiencies in
the literature which this Article aims to resolve. First, extant works
have not addressed the communication framework of the patent system per se. Scholars have focused on the capability to convey messages through patents in particular contexts. For instance, Long and
Anderson have discussed patent disclosure, specifically in the investing sphere, and Asay has focused on pledges.78 More generally,
although some works have acknowledged the patent system’s communicative power, none thoroughly delineate the theoretical foundations, structure, or overall framework of patent communication.
Establishing such a framework is one of this Article’s goals.
Second, although current literature directly or indirectly addresses patents’ communicative power, such works do not harness
the potent power that lies within communication studies. Most
scholars address the communicative function only from patent law
and economic perspectives. To properly comprehend the multitude
ways in which the patent medium operates, one must utilize an interdisciplinary approach and apply tools and insights from communication studies. No literature to date has applied the prism of communication studies to investigate patent communication. This Article relies on both patent law and communication studies, offering a
thorough consideration of patent communication that rests on theoretical foundations of both relevant fields.
Third, the literature thus far has depicted the patent medium as
consisting of a sender and a recipient—an inventor/patentee79 on
one end, and (mainly) investors and competitors on the other. However, the scholarship has not considered the role of intermediaries.80

78

See Asay, supra note 12.
Note, that the inventor is not always the assignee, yet in some cases the law requires
it to include the inventor’s name. See 35 U.S.C. § 115(a); Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102.
80
Janis and Holbrook did discuss the importance of intermediaries, though their focus
was on the legal aspect rather than the communicative aspect. They mainly argued that the
intermediation process aids bridging the law to others, and more generally, making the law
more accessible. Whereas their argument is related to the current Article, here I consider
79
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For instance, Anderson refers to nontechnical disclosure as if the
public reads patent documents as a trivial matter,81 whereas such an
assumption is far-fetched. Resolving this gap is quite simple using
the concept of intermediation. Intermediaries comprise an essential
element in most communication systems,82 and patent communication is no exception. Various intermediaries operate in the context
of the patent medium; this includes patent agents and attorneys,
PTOs, journalists, innovation analysts, salespeople, government
agencies, and political entities. This Article’s interdisciplinary research incorporating communication studies into patent scholarship
introduces key elements of communication—specifically, the intermediation process, which is inherent to the patent medium.
Finally, most scholarship views patents as conveying one-way
messages under the senders’ control and underestimates the power
of recipients. For instance, Long and Anderson have focused on disclosure, a one-sided communicative deed conducted and controlled
by applicants.83 Disclosure is indeed a critical step in the patent medium; however, patent communication is much broader than the disclosure requirement alone. Put differently, patents generate a unique
conversation between parties, beyond the informative announcements that patentees deliver through disclosure.84 This reality underscores an additional point: patentees are dominant players, but they
are not the only players—others influence the message, including
recipients.85 Indeed, patent disclosure, albeit important, is not the
only message in patent communication.

intermediaries in a much broader way, beyond the straightforward aspect of explaining
rules. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 33, at 75, 86–88 (“[P]atent law could operate more
effectively if it . . . devised pragmatic mechanisms—intermediaries—to bridge the distance
between formal patent law rules and the targeted audience for those rules.”).
81
See Anderson, supra note 12, at 1577 (discussing public disclosure).
82
See KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17.
83
See Amanda F. Myers et al., The USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset: Descriptions
and Analysis (USPTO, Working Paper No. 2015-2).
84
See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. Also, consider instances such as patent
reviews, the early publication practice, the patent continuation practice, cross-licensing,
patent pools, and standard-essential patents. Later, this Article elaborates on some of these
examples.
85
See Katz et al., supra note 17. For elaboration, see infra Part IV.A.3 for a discussion
regarding patent reviews and the continuation practice.

876

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:857

Although existing literature appears to allude to this Article’s
general argument, the points made herein expose significant interspaces in the present understanding of patent communication. This
Article fill these gaps and clarify misconceptions. Using both patent
law and communication studies, this Article formulates a broad and
well-founded communication paradigm of the patent medium. Such
a paradigm will enable stakeholders to better understand and explain
the patent system.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION MODELS: FROM LINEAR
TO TRANSACTIONAL MODELS
This Part introduces fundamental concepts in information and
communication theories that serve as building blocks for later Parts
of this Article. This Part introduces the most common communication models: the linear model, the interactional model, and the transactional model.86 It portrays the gradual progress from the basic, linear model to the more comprehensive transactional model.
Communication comprises the transmission of messages between parties. In its most basic form, communication involves a
sender (or speaker), recipient (or listener), and information. However, most communication processes are more complex.87 Communication can occur directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, implicitly or explicitly, synchronously or asynchronously,
within an intimate group of friends or among innumerable strangers.
The major players who participate in communication processes
are the senders, recipients, and intermediaries.88 The sender is the
one who initiates a message.89 The sender encodes the message and
relays it to recipients.90 Traditional notions of sending involve

86

See generally KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17, at 31–42, 309–21; SHANNON &
WEAVER, supra note 18, at 6–8.
87
See DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 13–35 (6th ed.
2010); Manuel Castells, Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network
Society, 1 INT’L J. COMMC’N 238, 246–52 (2007) (describing the complex, networked
nature of the current communication space).
88
JOHNSTONE, supra note 17, at 128–61; MCQUAIL, supra note 87.
89
MCQUAIL, supra note 87, at 83–84.
90
Id.
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speaking and writing, but many other actions can be used to deliver
a message, such as gesturing.91
The recipient is the message’s destination.92 A recipient decodes
the sender’s message, attempting to understand what the message
means.93 Early communication models underestimated the power of
recipients and their capability to influence a communication process.94 Indeed, the term “recipient” implies passivity. However, in
practice, a recipient holds significant power, which is no less important than that of the sender. For a communication process to succeed, both the sender and the recipient must engage; namely, by
playing an active role.95
The intermediary is an entity that serves as a bridge from the
sender to possible recipients.96 At times, multiple intermediaries are
involved, especially in our global, branched, and digital culture.97
The intermediation process is particularly significant in communication theory.98 Intermediaries execute essential communicative actions, such as regulating, editing, and republishing.99 Moreover, they
are prevalent in various communicative events, such as in formulating, distributing, and commentating on a message.100
The classical communication models are rooted in these basic
notions.101 In 1948, mathematician and engineer Claude Shannon
published a paper that established a new research field: information

91

Id.
Id.
93
See generally Claude E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27
BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379, 379 (1948).
94
See id. at 381 fig.1.
95
UMBERTO ECO, ROLE OF THE READER 3–43, 49 (1979) (“ . . . each individual addressee
can refashion the original composition devised by the author. The addressee is bound to
enter into an interplay of stimulus and response which depends on his unique capacity for
sensitive reception of the piece.”).
96
See Davis Foulger, Roles In Media, Presentation at DIAC-02 Shaping the Network
Society (May 18, 2002), http://davis.foulger.info/presentations/rolesInMedia.htm
[https://perma.cc/PY6X-BWCE].
97
See JAN HARRIS & PAUL TAYLOR, DIGITAL MATTERS: THE THEORY AND CULTURE OF
THE MATRIX 175–92 (2005); KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17, at 128–61.
98
See KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25.
99
See KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25.
100 K
ATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17, at 1, 32–33; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25.
101
See KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25.
92
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theory.102 In brief, information theory studies the measurement,
quantification, transmission, and storage of information.103 Shannon
introduced a well-structured communication model comprised of
several components: information source, transmitter, channel, receiver, and destination.104 When these elements are placed in sequence, communication transpires.105 A source sends a message encoded in the form of a signal and transmitted over a communication
channel to a receiver who decodes the signal back into a message
that eventually arrives at a destination.106 Shannon’s paper drew
considerable attention from communication theorists,107 who, like
information theorists, engage with information transmission, but
with very different tools typically emerging from disciplines such as
sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and psychology.108 Shannon
and Warren Weaver published a book that made Shannon’s model
more accessible to non-mathematicians.109
The Shannon-Weaver model is linear.110 It conceives of communication as a one-way process, in which the sender is the sole,
dominant, active player.111 Despite its significant contribution to
102

See Sergio Verdu, Fifty Years of Shannon Theory, 44 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO.
THEORY 2057, 2057 (1998) (“Shannon’s discovery of the fundamental laws of data
compression and transmission marks the birth of Information Theory.”).
103
See Aleksandra Karolak et al., Concepts and Applications of Information Theory to
Immuno-Oncology, 7 TRENDS IN CANCER 335, 336 (2021) (“Information Theory (IT)
describes and quantifies information storage and communication in a mathematically
rigorous fashion.”).
104 See Shannon, supra note 93, at 380–82.
105 See id. at 381 fig.1.
106
See id.
107
See JOHN FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 6 (1982).
108 See BERLO, supra note 18, at Preface.
109
See generally SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 18.
110 Daniel Chandler, The Transmission Model of Communication, UWA, http://visualmemory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/short/trans.html [https://perma.cc/DLA4-E4Z5] (Dec. 9,
2020, 8:16 PM).
111 Li Hong Ling, From Shannon-Weaver to Boisot: A Review on the Research of
Knowledge Transfer Model, in 2007 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS
COMMUNICATIONS, NETWORKING AND MOBILE COMPUTING 5439, 5439 (2007) (“The
transfer direction can not be reversed and there is no information feedback either.”);
Yingnan Yang & Yanfei Jiang, Research on the Impacts of BIM on Information Exchange
Between Stakeholders in Construction Project, in 6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ELECTRONICS, MECHANICS, CULTURE AND MEDICINE 520, 529 (2015) (“That is, it [the
Shannon-Weaver model] is still just a one-way linear transmission without feedback.”).
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communication theory, later studies pointed to a shortcoming in the
Shannon-Weaver model: the linear model did not capture all the fundamental features of a communication process.112 For instance, intermediation is not part of this model. Elements in this model that
somewhat resemble the notion of intermediation are very meager
and technical, addressing only the electrical aspect of intermediation—specifically, noise that impairs information quality throughout its journey from a sender to a recipient.113 Another limitation of
the Shannon-Weaver model is the distinction between communication sessions.114 Each session transpires independently as if it has a
known, fixed time window occurring independently, absent any
context.115
In general, three notable underlying assumptions are particularly
problematic in the Shannon-Weaver model: (1) recipients are assumed to be passive players; (2) communication is limited to one
message per one recipient; and (3) the communication process is
viewed as having precise beginning and ending points.116 The linear
model’s simplicity, which makes it elegant and instructive, also limits its scope.
Communication theorists proceeded to develop more complex
models. Wilber Schramm was the first to move in this direction, offering the interactional model in 1954,117 which contributed the
principle of the feedback layer. Schramm’s model portrayed communication as a two-way or circular interaction.118 Feedback covers
important events transpiring during a communication process, such

112

MCQUAIL, supra note 87, at 85–86, 96.
Noise can be any unwanted disturbance in an electrical signal. Naturally, such a
disturbance may affect the sending, receiving, or understanding of a message. In
contemporary communication studies, the term noise has expanded to include all kind of
unwanted disturbances, not only electrical ones. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 18, at 5.
114 M Q
C UAIL, supra note 87, at 84.
115 The context or frames of reference element was introduced later by Schramm. See
Schramm, infra note 118, at 30–34.
116 See supra notes 111–14.
117
See Wilbur L. Schramm, How Communication Works, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS
OF MASS COMMUNICATION 3, 6 (Wilbur L. Schramm ed., 1st ed. 1954).
118
Wilbur L. Schramm, The Nature of Communication Between Humans, in THE
PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 3, 23–27 (Wilbur L. Schramm ed., rev.
ed. 1971).
113
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as gauging reception, understanding, and reactions.119 The interactional model introduced two essential elements: (1) the communication context—the setting in which communication takes place—as
a factor affecting a message; and (2) the field of experience, which
refers to the background and culture of the communicators and in
turn influences the encoding and decoding of messages.120 However,
like the Shannon-Weaver model, the interactional model fails to provide a full account of communication. For instance, the interactional
model made some progress in depicting senders and recipients as
engaged in a back-and-forth interchange, rather than conveying
messages independently.121 However, this model did not cover the
idea of parallel communications; that is, communication processes
that transpire simultaneously.
In 1970, Dean Barnlund proposed an improved model—the
transactional model.122 His most significant innovation was simultaneity. As its name implies, this model likens communication to a
transaction: communication is an interactive, simultaneous game in
which participants play together because their interests overlap.123
While the interactional model describes communication as a turnbased process, the transactional model describes multiple, parallel
lines of exchanging messages simultaneously.124 The transactional
model highlights the role of recipients and intermediaries.125 Studies
have shown that recipients are not weak, passive players but rather
play a substantial, active role.126 Similarly, scholars recognize the
influence intermediaries have over communications, underscoring
that the communication process is not a sender-centric game.127 Figure 1 below summarizes the three classical models:
119

See Edward J. Downes & Sally J. McMillan, Defining Interactivity: A Qualitative
Identification of Key Dimensions, 2 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 157, 158 (2000).
120 See Schramm, supra note 118, at 31–32 (“The similarity of meaning which Mr. A and
Mr. B will perceive in a message depends on finding an area where the experience of the
two people is sufficiently similar that they can share the same signs efficiently.”).
121 See id. at 26–34 and accompanying figures and explanations.
122 See Barnlund, supra note 20, at 85.
123 See id. at 87–88.
124
See id. at 90–91, 95.
125 See id. at 85 (underscoring the importance of interpretation in communications).
126
See ECO, supra note 95; Charles J. Fillmore, Ideal Readers and Real Readers, in
ANALYZING DISCOURSE: TEXT AND TALK 248, 248 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1982).
127
See JOHNSTONE, supra note 17, at 1–31, 128–61; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25.
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Figure 1: Three classical communication models
In distinguishing between the linear and transactional models, it
is important to note that linear models conceive of communication
as a one-way channel, whereas transactional models describe communication as a conversation. Thus, players’ communicative roles
in the transactional model are not static; senders become recipients
(and vice versa) and intermediaries shift positions from recipients to
interpreters. This dynamic process seems to characterize a conversation rather than a one-way dissemination stream.128
Compared to the linear and interactional models, the transactional model is more sophisticated and stratified. Indeed, the transactional model is the most comprehensive and fine-tuned communication model. It includes all major components of previous models
and introduces important, new ingredients. Despite its complexity,
the transactional model is very popular amid scholars because of its
systematic approach.129 Over fifty years since its inception, the

128

KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17.
In the last twenty years, scholars cited Barnlund’s work roughly 570 times. See
GOOGLE,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=iw&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0%2C5&
cites=11668844379260767561&scipsc=&as_ylo=2002&as_yhi= (last visited May 10,
2022). Many of these studies relied on the transactional model as a valuable, relevant model
of communication. See, e.g., Harmanpreet Kaur et al., Interpreting Interpretability:
Understanding Data Scientists’ Use of Interpretability Tools for Machine Learning, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS,
Paper 92, at 10 (2020); Doris M. Merkl-Davies & Niamh M. Brennan, A Theoretical
Framework of External Accounting Communication: Research Perspectives, Traditions,

129
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transactional model still draws researchers’ attention, serving as the
theoretical foundation for many studies.130
The gradual progress from a linear model to a transactional one
was necessary to fully comprehend communication processes. A
static paradigm, as reflected in the linear model, does not reflect the
real nature of communication; to accomplish profound and broad
comprehension, communication theorists had to capture the dynamic nature of the phenomenon in their models. Later, this Article
argues that a similar shift must occur in the context of the patent
medium. Namely, to fully understand patent communication—and
generally, the patent system—we should advance from a static, linear paradigm to a dynamic, transactional one.
III. THE CURRENT MINDSET OF PATENT COMMUNICATION: THE
BULLETIN-BOARD PARADIGM AND ITS DEFICIENCIES
This Part addresses the existing conception of the patent medium
and problems with its conception. Section A reveals a tacit communication mindset that currently resides in patent scholarship and case
law, which this Article entitles the bulletin-board paradigm. Although the bulletin-board paradigm offers substantial value, Section
B shows that this paradigm does not provide a full comprehension
of patent communication. This Article uses three phenomena to
demonstrate how and why the bulletin-board paradigm fails: (1) patent pledges, (2) early publication, and (3) the first-to-file rule.

and Theories, 30 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 433, 463 (2017) (“the
transactional model of communication is particularly useful, as it emphasizes the relational
and conversational component of communication.”); Julius C. Pham et al., What to Do with
Healthcare Incident Reporting Systems, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH RES. 154, 157 (2013). In 2008,
Barnlund’s work was republished in a special edition. Dean C. Barnlund, A Transactional
Model of Communication, in COMMUNICATION THEORY 47 (C. David Mortensen ed., 2008).
130 See, e.g., Andrew M. Baker et al., Investigating How Word-of-Mouth Conversations
About Brands Influence Purchase and Retransmission Intentions, 53 J. MKTG. RSCH. 225,
226 (2016); W. Barnett Pearce & Stewart M. Sharp, Self-Disclosing Communication, 23 J.
COMMC’N 409, 410 (1973); Eduardo Salas et al., Understanding and Improving Teamwork
in Organizations: A Scientifically Based Practical Guide, 54 HUM. RES. MGMT 599, 607
(2015).
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A. The Patent Medium as a Bulletin Board
This Section presents the paradigm governing patent communication’s current perception. This Article refers to this undeclared
(yet present) mindset as the bulletin-board paradigm, because the
communication process it suggests resembles the act of posting informative notes on a public message board. In many respects, this
paradigm corresponds to the linear model of communication.
Whereas this paradigm provides some insights regarding patent
communication, this Article argues that it falls short of presenting
the complete picture.
To begin, this Section describes five elements comprising the
bulletin-board paradigm and anchors each to trends and approaches
evident in academic literature and case law.
1. Informing
The first element is a focus on informing rather than communicating. As Part I indicated, when commentators discuss patent communication, they focus on a patent’s content, particularly the information disclosed about the invention.131 For them, the communicative value of patents boils down to the informational aspect, with a
strong, almost-exclusive emphasis on the disclosure requirement.132
Another example that highlights the current mindset is case law and
literature’s focus on prior art as an informative component.133 Prior
art constitutes all information publicly available before the filing
date of a patent application—including other patents and patent

131

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003); W.L. Gore Assocs., Inc., v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Fromer, supra note 1; Rantanen, supra
note 1; Seymore, supra note 4.
132 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“The purpose of a patent system . . . serves to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge.”); Anderson, supra note 12, at 1585 (“[A]ccording to
disclosure theorists, the patent system can be justified by how much information it brings
to the public that otherwise would be private.”).
133 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (setting the
underlying factual determinations to be made when examining whether prior art should
lead to the legal conclusion of invalidity); Christopher A. Cotropia & David L. Schwartz,
The Hidden Value of Abandoned Applications to the Patent System, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2809,
2815–33 (2020) (discussing the informational value of published (including abandoned)
patent applications as prior art, specifically for patent examiners).
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applications—which may be used to determine novelty and non-obviousness of subject matter.134 Put differently, prior art delineates
what content is no longer considered new or sufficiently inventive
to be patented. Like the disclosure requirement, prior art serves an
informational role.135
The spotlight on the informing function, rather than the communicating function, fits the patent system’s principal goal—disseminating novel knowledge in exchange for exclusive rights.136
Numerous articles and abundant case law address patents as information distributors, but hardly study the communicative aspect.137
Indeed, the organizing principle of this approach is dissemination,
not communication. Recall that informing and communicating share
some common features but are different functions.138
2. Linearity
Patent communication’s current conception is a one-way communication channel. Information passes from the patentee to others
without reply. Even the social pact metaphor, which is widely applied to the patent system, reflects communication linearity in the
patent system: patentees exchange novel, innovative information for
the right to exclusivity.139 The current perception of patent communication disregards other communication channels that diverge from
the usual patentee-to-public channel.140 Therefore, this approach

134

35 U.S.C. § 102. For a discussion about secret prior art, see Part IV.B.2.
For elaboration on the relationship between patent disclosure and its status as prior
art, see generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Written Description Gap, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
345 (2013).
136
See sources cited supra note 1.
137 See sources cited supra note 12.
138
See supra notes 10, 48 and accompanying text.
139 Bracha, supra note 31, at 380 (“[A] system for securing property in the products of
genius, is a mutual contract between the inventor and the public.” (alteration in original));
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1315–21 (2004) (“[D]isclosure [of an
invention] is ‘the price paid for the exclusivity secured.’”); Sean B. Seymore, Symposium:
The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2016) (“[I]n
exchange for the right to exclude, the inventor must fully disclose the technical details of
the invention.”).
140
See Part IV.A.1.–2.
135
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views patent communication as limited to what a patentee broadcasts to a receiver, with the issue of recipient feedback overlooked.
There exist incidents of reverse-direction action—meaning, action from the public toward a patentee. For instance, when a party
challenges a patent, such an act comprises the public’s reaction to a
patentee.141 However, research surrounding these cases has not focused on the communicative context, even though they offer much
to explore on the communicative level. Instead, studies focus on legal or economic aspects, such as reforms in the reexamination proceedings or manners in which oppositions affect market strategy.142
3. Sender-Centric Perspective
The third element is the dominance of the inventor/applicant in
patent communication. Namely, the current view of patent communication perceives the inventor/applicant as the dominant player in
patent communication.143 The applicant formulates the communication and chooses what to disclose, as well as when and how to disclose it. No other players—and specifically not the public—are
party to this act Indeed, this dominance is not absolute. Some legal
rules impose limits on the applicant’s dominance, from a communication perspective, the applicant remains the most powerful player
within the patent space—for example, drawing standards144 and rejection of claims145 influence the content, structure, and presentation
of patent documents. Accordingly, this Article does not contend that

141

For a discussion regarding GMO patents, Myriad’s BRCA patents, and the
Chakrabarty case, see infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text.
142
See Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures:
Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 381, 381 (2009) (describing strategies and dynamics between infringers and
patentees due to the reexamination system); Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and Abuse of
Patent Reexamination: Sham Petitioning Before the USPTO, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 92 (2011) (exploring ways in which reexamination is vulnerable to abuse, through
closely looking at prominent instances, and offering solutions to curb such an abuse);
Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not
a Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. BAR J. 177, 192–204 (2009) (reviewing the reexamination
statute, statutory revisions, and judicial decisions related to the reexamination system and
contemplating their consequences).
143
See supra note 15.
144 37 C.F.R. § 1.84 (2020).
145
Id. § 1.104(c).
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the current paradigm views the applicant as holding absolute or exclusive control over the process. Rather, it argues that the bulletinboard paradigm holds the applicant to be the most dominant player,
while overlooking other players’ substantial restraints and important
roles.
4. Publicity
The present conception of patent communication is oriented toward communication that transpires in the public sphere—primarily
via the disclosure requirement.146 However, alongside the public
sphere, other private, sometimes confidential spheres are evident,
such as patent licensing, patent settlements, and patent applicantattorney communications—all of which occur in private settings.147
Such non-public communication flies under the current paradigm’s
radar.148
Importantly, this Article does not argue that all patent communications be public. Some media, including the patent medium, allow participants to communicate with each other along various

146

See sources cited supra note 34.
In re Spalding Sports Worldwide Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ruling that if a
record is prepared and submitted primarily for the purpose of legal advice or services (e.g.,
validating patentability or submitting a patent application), it is privileged in its entirety);
Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
257, 257 (2007) (arguing that due to the confidentiality of patent licenses, players must
navigate through a “blind” market, and therefore, buyers and sellers often miss each other);
Mark R. Patterson, Confidentiality in Patent Dispute Resolution: Antitrust Implications, 93
WASH. L. REV. 827, 835–41 (2018) (discussing the competitive implications of
confidentiality in patent dispute resolution, particularly arbitration and the FRAND
context).
148 Some scholars have discussed indirectly private channels of patent licenses and patent
settlements; however, there is no substantial consideration of their communicative quality.
See generally, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67
VAND. L. REV. 375 (2014) (addressing problems created by patent settlements, especially
that settlement allows potentially invalid patents to remain in force in contravention of the
public good. La Belle argues that settlement is not the best way to resolve all patent disputes
from a social welfare perspective, and proposes that trial judges serve as protectors of the
public interest); Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. 115 (2015) (arguing that the use of licenses to measure reasonable royalty damages
leads to significant problems: courts rely on private information, it is a ineluctably circular
measure, and it incentivizes patentees to distort licenses’ value).
147
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degrees of access.149 However, this Article does argue that we are
inclined to disregard the communicative value of non-public channels, resulting in misconceptions about patent communication.150
5. Few Players
The current comprehension of patent communication primarily
focuses on a single protagonist (the applicant) and two deuteragonists (the public and the PTO).151 The current, thin communication
approach neglects to account for the communicative value of various players in the patent medium, such as patent agents, patent attorneys, licensees, legal parties, countries, tech-fans, and journalists,
despite their significance in the communication context.152 Even
when contemplating the courts’ or patent attorneys’ actions, the current mindset perceives of these actions as technical-legal functions
and not communicative ones.
***
Jointly, the five elements comprise a communication paradigm
that resembles a bulletin board: it is public and linear—namely, it is
accessible to all and directed from senders to recipients. The essence
of a message on a bulletin board is the content, and the communication arena consists of limited types of participants—the advertisers,
the public, and perhaps even advertising agents. The advertiser is
the dominant, active player, whereas the remaining two—particularly the public—are relatively passive participants.
Factors outside the limited scope of the bulletin-board paradigm,
such as interactions between the applicant and patent agent, licensing issues, or the information in file wrappers,153 are inherent to the
149

For instance, public communications such as the disclosure requirement and private
communications such as patent licenses. See supra notes 146–47.
150
One exception to this publicity-oriented mindset is the PTO-applicant
communication. It is a semi-public channel (i.e., the file-wrapper is available in some cases
on the Patent Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) system), defined by norms held
in patent law, such as duty of disclosure, candor, and good faith. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)
(2020).
151
Specifically, subgroups of the public, such as competitors, investors, inventors, and
scientists. See supra Part I.
152
See sources cited supra notes 5–9.
153 File wrapper is a written record of correspondences between the PTO and an applicant
regarding a patent application, preceding the issuance of the patent.
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patent space. Notably, extant scholarship and case law are not blind
to these factors.154 However, when courts or scholars perceive of the
patent system through the prism of the bulletin-board paradigm,
their ability to unpack the communicative significance and role of
such factors is limited.155 The reason for such limitation is that the
bulletin-board paradigm does not consider these factors as bearing
communicative value but instead focuses on their legal or economic
implications.156
B. Deficiencies of the Bulletin-Board Paradigm
This Section argues that the bulletin-board paradigm fails, at
least partially, in providing a comprehensive, convincing explanation of patent communication. This Article points to weak spots in
the bulletin-board paradigm and underscores its difficulty to
properly cope with various phenomena within the patent space. To
demonstrate this failure, the following Section utilizes three sample
phenomena in the following order: (1) patent pledging, (2) the early
publication practice, and (3) the first-to-file (“FTF”) rule. The rationale behind choosing these sample phenomena is the patent
lifecycle; to cover the whole patent lifecycle, this Article divides the
patent timeline into three major phases and analyzes one phenomenon for each of the phases. The post-grant phase includes issues
arising after the PTO grants a patent (e.g., patent pledging). The pregrant phase includes issues emerging after an individual applies for
a patent but before it is granted (e.g., early publication). The preexamination phase involves issues regarding the justifications behind bestowing patents (e.g., the FTF rule). The three phenomena
demonstrate problems with the bulletin-board paradigm, each regarding its respective phase.
1. Patent Pledging
Patent pledges are promises by patentees not to enforce their patents under certain conditions.157 Pledging is a growing trend, with
154

See sources cited supra notes 5–9.
See sources cited supra notes 5–9.
156
See sources cited supra notes 5–9.
157 See Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob, Introduction, in P
ATENT PLEDGES 1, 1–4
(Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017).
155
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top firms pledging their patents.158 Moreover, this trend has intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, as leading firms like Moderna
pledged their patents.159 Attempts to explain pledges through the
bulletin-board paradigm face three significant difficulties. First, the
bulletin-board paradigm only acknowledges patent communication
that takes place in official documents, primarily through patent disclosures.160 However, patentees publish pledges independently,
most often on the internet, apart from the official patent documentation.161 As artifacts that are external to the formal patent channel,
they remain overlooked and outside the scope of the bulletin-board
paradigm.
Second, pledging is a type of communication that is entirely voluntary, as the act exceeds the disclosure requirement imposed by the
patent bargain.162 Thus, one may ask why a patentee would bother
to disclose something not required, particularly if such a step involves waiving potent rights? The bulletin-board paradigm maintains that patent communication transpires only due to an obligation;
therefore, the paradigm fails to cope with pledging.
Third, the bulletin-board paradigm holds that the dissemination
of patent information is designated for the public’s benefit.163

158

See Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/
opnpledge/pledge/ [https://perma.cc/GVW6-7GD8]; Open Specification Promise,
MICROSOFT
(2007),
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/dev_center/msdevcentlp/1c24c7c8-28b0-4ce1-a47d-95fe1ff504bc [https://perma.cc/Y6YH-VC53]; Elon
Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA (2014), https://www.tesla.com/blog/allour-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/R3MR-UHMU].
159
See Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters During the COVID-19
Pandemic, MODERNA, https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-releasedetails/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/GE8B-2X8Y];
The
Pledgors,
OPEN
COVID
PLEDGE,
https://opencovidpledge.org/partners/
[https://perma.cc/B3VN-6ZVU].
For
a
comprehensive review of this phenomenon during the COVID-19 pandemic, see Jorge L.
Contreras, The Open COVID Pledge: Design, Implementation and Preliminary Assessment
of an Intellectual Property Commons, 2021 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
160 See supra notes 131–38, 146–50 and accompanying text.
161
See supra notes 158–59. Contreras has proposed to incorporate pledges into the
official patent record, see Jorge L. Contreras, A Registry for Patent Pledges, in PATENT
PLEDGES 290, 290 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017).
162 See supra note 139.
163
See supra note 131.
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However, pledging a patent—whatever the purpose164—benefits
both sides, primarily the patentee.165 This must be the case, since
pledging is a voluntary act and waiving patent rights for nothing
would be illogical and detached from the realities of the business
world.166 Thus, the bulletin-board paradigm leaves questions unanswered regarding the reason for pledges and their communicative
role.
2. Early Publication
U.S. patent law requires publication of a patent application no
later than eighteen months from its filing date.167 Yet, practice reveals an intriguing phenomenon: approximately half of applicants
request that the PTO publish their application earlier.168 Moreover,
U.S. patent law allows applicants who waived foreign filing rights
to opt out of the eighteen-month deadline, so an application is entitled to a further period of secrecy before its publication.169 Interestingly, scholars have found that twenty-one percent of applicants that
were eligible to opt out of the eighteen-month deadline chose not to
do so.170 Importantly, the twenty-one percent figure refers to applicants who filed an application in the United States solely, and not
abroad.171 This explains the non-opting-out phenomenon on the
164

There are four main categories: inducement, collective action, voluntary restraint, or
philanthropic (or public relations). See Contreras, supra note 27, at 593.
165
See Jonas F. Ehrnsperger & Frank Tietze, Motives for Patent Pledges: A Qualitative
Study (Univ. of Cambridge Ctr. for Tech. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2019/11) (“We
found . . . the primary motive [of patent pledging] being ‘Driving Technology
Diffusion.’”); Liza Vertinsky, Hidden Costs of Free Patents, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1379
(2017) (arguing that patent pledges may enhance patent hold-up, foreclosing alternative
technology paths, and creating entry barriers).
166 There is a commercial reason even in so-called altruism, such as in implementing
corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., Camelia-Daniela Hategan et al., Doing Well or
Doing Good: The Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit in
Romanian Companies, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 1041 (2018) (finding that companies which
implement CSR activities in a greater extent are more profitable in economic terms).
167 See supra note 22.
168 See supra note 25.
169 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213 (2012). Opting out is limited to cases in which “the invention
disclosed in an application has not been and will not be the subject of an application filed
in another country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires publication
of applications eighteen months after filing.” Id.
170 See sources cited supra note 26.
171
See Glaeser & Landsman, supra note 25, at 296.
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basis of a tradeoff with the foreign applications—namely, that applicants prefer to publish within eighteen months and not bear the
heavy sacrifice of waiving foreign filing rights172—is not a valid account.173 Moreover, note that early publication and the no opt-out
option neither confers patent rights nor expedites the examination
process.
Efforts to explain this practice using the bulletin-board paradigm
face two major obstacles. First, the bulletin-board paradigm maintains that publication is merely a means to obtain the applicant’s interest—patent rights.174 In fact, commentators perceive such publication as a sacrifice on the part of applicants against their interests,
which patent law aims to solve by incentivizing disclosure.175
Hence, one might expect applicants to try disclosing as little information as possible and defer disclosing to the greatest extent possible (at the least until the patent is granted).176 However, reality
proves otherwise; not only do applicants generally not opt out of the
eighteen-month deadline, but many seek to publish earlier.177 Applying the bulletin-board paradigm leads to a counterintuitive conclusion, whereby applicants appear to be acting against their own
interests.
Second, the bulletin-board paradigm assumes that publication
has a unilateral purpose—to inform the public regarding technical
and legal issues.178 Thus, publishing an application should serve this
goal. However, recall that at the early publication stage, an application is still under examination.179 Namely, the PTO has not approved
the technical and legal significance of the application.180 Therefore,
such information does not fulfill the traditional communicative goal

172

See id.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
174
As, according to the traditional view, information disclosure is an instrumental action,
done to secure patent rights. See sources cited supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
175 See Holbrook, supra note 23, at 126–27.
176 See Cohen-Sasson, supra note 3, at 274.
177 The early publication practice is even more surprising, since deferring the deadline
may exempt applicants from publication in the future (e.g., due to rejection of an
application or abandoning it).
178
See supra note 131.
179 See supra note 22.
180
35 U.S.C. § 131.
173
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of the patent system; thus, there is no reason to publish this information before it is relevant (i.e., the PTO should not approve early
publication). Nevertheless, early publication is a common, official
practice in patent law.181
3. First-to-File Rule
After decades of heated debate,182 the America Invents Act
(“AIA”) transitioned the American patent system from a first-to-invent (“FTI”) system to a FTF system.183 In brief, the FTI regime
held an inventor eligible for a patent if the individual was first to
invent (i.e., conceived of the invention first and diligently reduced
it to practice).184 The FTF system instructs that the right to patent an
invention lies with the first inventor to file the patent application,
regardless of the invention date.185
To justify the FTF reform, commentators have raised, inter alia,
communication-related arguments (though they did not use this

181

See Glaeser & Landsman, supra note 25.
See S. Doc. No. 90-5 (1967); Charles L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 891, 892 (2000) (arguing for the FTF rule reform);
Charles R. B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 197 (1990) (reviewing the advantages
and disadvantages of adopting the FTF rule); Rebecca C. E. McFadyen, The “First-toFile” Patent System: Why Adoption Is Not an Option!, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 61 (2007)
(arguing against the FTF reform because it may lead to “irreparable harm to American
innovation”); Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable
Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2013) (asserting that
the FTF rule violates two Constitutional provisions).
183
The American patent system is not identical to the traditional FTF rule. See Mark A.
Lemley, Does Public Use Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX L. REV. 1119
(2015) (“ . . . (under the American FTF-like rule), unlike many other countries, inventors
can also satisfy the obligation to share the invention with the world by making a ‘public
disclosure’ such as a publication or a public sale; doing so gives the inventor a year to get
her invention on file.”); Tara Rachinsky et al., First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File: Impact
of the AIA, 3 PHARM. PAT. ANALYST 353 (2014) (“The biggest difference is one of the
[one]-year safe harbor for public disclosures of an invention. The rest of the world still has
a rule of absolute priority with no safe harbor or a very narrow window ([six] months as
opposed to [one] year in the U[nited] S[tates]).”).
184
See Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d
1200, 1205–06 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
185
See Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205–06; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).
A caveat is due: there is a protection against derivation. The first-to-file applicant loses if
they derived the invention from someone else.
182
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terminology explicitly). One argument cited the incentive disclosure
early.186 FTF makes the filing date crucial; therefore, inventors
would apply for a patent sooner and consequently, information
would be available earlier to further advance innovation.187 This argument coincides with the bulletin-board paradigm, which advocates the value of patents’ informing function—the sooner, the better.188
However, applying the bulletin-board paradigm to the FTF regime fails to explain one issue—the changes that FTF made for participants other than the public.189 The bulletin-board paradigm underscores the communicative contribution of the FTF reform for recipients in the patent space; that is, expediting the arrival of patent
information to the public.190 But what are the communicative implications of the FTF reform from other participants’ perspectives? For
instance, from the perspective of (potential) senders? From PTOs?
What about from other participants in the patent space?
IV. A NEW, PREFERABLE COMMUNICATION PARADIGM: THE
PATENT MEDIUM AS A NETWORK
This Part aims to formulate a new, alternative communication
paradigm of patent communication: the network paradigm. Section
A defines the network paradigm and characterizes it through five
features. Whereas the bulletin-board paradigm reflects the linear
communication model, this Section indicates how the network paradigm resembles the transactional model. Therefore, the network
paradigm offers a more comprehensive approach toward the patent
medium. Section B again summons the three sample phenomena
discussed above191 to demonstrate the superiority of the network
paradigm over the bulletin-board paradigm. Therefore, this Section
suggests adopting the network paradigm as a more holistic outlook

186

See Gholz, supra note 182, at 895.
See id.; President’s Commission, supra note 182, at 3, 6.
188
See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
189 Namely, the advantages of expedited disclosures outside the trivial context of legaltechnical informing.
190 See Gholz, supra note 182, at 895.
191
See supra Part III.B.
187
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for the patent medium. This proposal—calling for progress from the
bulletin-board paradigm to the network paradigm—resembles and
is inspired by the broader move in communication studies from a
simple, linear model to a branched, transactional model.
A. The Network Paradigm
This Section offers a new communication paradigm of the patent
medium—the network paradigm. It introduces five communicative
elements of the network paradigm and juxtaposes each with the respective feature in the bulletin-board paradigm. Note that the network paradigm does not reject the benefits provided by the bulletinboard paradigm; instead, the network paradigm constitutes a more
comprehensive framework, containing the insights of the bulletinboard paradigm but not limited to its paradigmatic borders.
1. “The What”: The Communicating Function
The bulletin-board paradigm analysis underscores that the primary use of the patent medium is to inform others, chiefly through
patent disclosure.192 Under the network paradigm, however, the focus is on communicating. Instead of merely informing others about
novel inventions and legal constraints, the patent medium facilitates
various types of communicative ends: critique, public relations, debating, brainstorming, misleading, establishing or substantiating a
community, and much more.193 Moreover, one communicative act
in the patent medium can serve multiple purposes. A patent text can
fulfill a certain goal toward the PTO (e.g., proving novelty in the
legal sense),194 another goal vis-à-vis consumers (by sensing their

192

See sourced cited supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
See Alan Friedman, Apple’s Latest Patent Application Is Related to an Accessory We
Could See Early Next Year, PHONEARENA (Oct. 17, 2019, 4:26 PM),
https://www.phonearena.com/news/New-patent-applicated-filed-for-AppleTags_id119762
[https://perma.cc/ZHV3-8YG5];
GIZMOCHINA,
Patents,
https://www.gizmochina.com/?s=patents (last visited Apr. 11, 2022); PATENTLY APPLE,
https://www.patentlyapple.com/ [https://perma.cc/Z2GQ-B2P2]; PATENTLY MOBILE,
https://www.patentlymobile.com/ [https://perma.cc/55J6-K975]; Michael Zhang, Canon
Designed a Crazy 50-80mm f/1.1 Lens, PETAPIXEL (Aug. 10, 2019), https://petapixel.com/
2019/08/10/canon-designed-a-50-80mm-f-1-1-lens/ [https://perma.cc/E5TC-K2GB]. See
also sources cited supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
194
35 U.S.C. §§ 112–113.
193
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reception of a possible innovation195), and an entirely different goal
toward competitors (such as contouring a territory of technological
dominance).196 Another example of how communicative acts have
multiple goals is a patent pledge, through which a patentee can both
improve public relations and signal willingness to collaborate.197
Other examples include patent challenges and patent oppositions. Alongside its legal purpose, the act of opposing a patent application or challenging a patent can serve as a social activism tool;
for example, three bold, illustrative cases are the opposition against
Monsanto’s patent application for a GMO melon,198 the dystopian
and ethical arguments in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,199 and the challenging of Myriad’s BRCA patents.200 Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics offers a particularly interesting example of how patent

195

See Anderson, supra note 12, at 1575–77.
Sharon D. James, The Use of Voluntary Public Disclosure and Patent Strategies to
Capture Value from Product Innovation, 16 J. APPLIED BUS. & ECON. 11, 11 (2014); Silvan
Berg et al., Identifying First Signals of Emerging Dominance in a Technological
Innovation System: A Novel Approach Based on Patents, 146 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC.
CHANGE 706, 708 (2019).
197 See JONATHAN BARNETT, INNOVATORS, FIRMS, AND MARKETS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
LOGIC OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xiv (2021) (arguing that patents enable upstream firms
that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that
specialize in commercialization, thus facilitating collaboration by lowering costs and
technical barriers); Asay, supra note 12, at 299, 306–07; Contreras, supra note 27, at 593.
198
See E.U. Patent No. EP1962578B1 (filed Dec. 21, 2006); Gargi Parsai, Opposition to
Monsanto Patent on Indian Melons, HINDU (Feb. 5, 2012, 2:49 AM),
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/opposition-to-monsanto-patent-on-indianmelons/article2861063.ece [https://perma.cc/Q57U-EHGT].
199
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (holding that a living, manmade micro-organism is patentable subject matter under the Patent Act of 1952). For
elaboration on such arguments in this case, see generally Brief for Peoples Business
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980) (No. 79-136); Jorge L. Contreras, Narratives of Gene Patenting, 43 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1133, 1165–69 (2016) (detecting and analyzing six narratives in gene patenting:
the Science, Innovator, Administrative, Access, Dystopian, and Congestion narrative.
Contreras demonstrates the Dystopian Narrative through the Diamond v. Chakrabarty
case).
200 See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 582
(2013); Michael Crichton, What’s Wrong with Patenting Genes?, Address to
Congressional Aides (Sept. 2006), http://www.whoownsyourbody.org/crichtoncongress.html [https://perma.cc/6BQP-Y9Z6]; The Fight to Take Back Our Genes, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/medical-and-genetic-privacy/fight-takeback-our-genes?redirect=fight-take-back-our-genes [https://perma.cc/FTZ5-UJVM].
196
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challenging serves as an act of social activism.201 Myriad addressed
questions regarding gene patenting.202 Throughout the case, many
activists and patients were eager to express their views, and their
assertions consisted of more than just legal arguments. They raised
ideas around human dignity, patient rights, access to healthcare,
anti-commodification of the human genome, and scientific freedom—issues rooted in moral philosophy and political sociology, not
patent law.203 Moreover, one of the two parties that filed the action
is the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a prominent activism organization, which referred to Myriad as a “fight to take
back our genes.”204 The Myriad case attracted much public attention: the media obsessively and extensively covered the case as an
issue of social activism and opposition that matters to society as a
whole, declaring that great public risk lies in Myriad’s patents.205
The case comprises part of a wider array of social activism and resistance to gene patenting.206 The point here is that when we view
patent challenges, we traditionally focus on the legal-economic
ends, which coincide with the bulletin-board paradigm, while overlooking the other ends, such as activism and social change. These
non-traditional ends do not necessarily replace the traditional ones
but pile up in addition to them.
These examples—patent text, patent pledging, and patent challenge—are just the tip of the iceberg. Other patent-related actions

201

Sandra S. Park, Gene Patents and the Public Interest: Litigating Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics and Lessons Moving Forward, 15 N.C. L.J &
TECH. 519 (2014) (describing the Myriad case as a public interest case in patent law
advocacy).
202 See id. (the main issue in the case was the eligibility of patents on the BRCA1/2
genes).
203 See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics: A Critical Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2021) (offering a textual
analysis of the Myriad decision); Contreras, supra note 199, at 1162–69 (analyzing the
Access and Dystopian Narratives in the Myriad case).
204 The Fight to Take Back Our Genes, supra note 200.
205 See Timothy Caulfield et al., Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene
Patent Controversy, 9 GENETICS MED. 850, 850 (2007) (finding that “Myriad Genetic’s
BRCA1/2 gene patents sparked significant international newspaper coverage in
comparison to other stories on gene patenting controversies,” with “majority of articles
(77.6%) had a negative overall tenor” and “only 6.29% had a positive overall tenor”).
206
See supra note 199.
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may realize multiple goals, some of them with communicative
value.
Another way patents serve a communicative role can be seen in
the distinction between content and meta-data. Under the bulletinboard paradigm, a patent medium’s primary component is the content, and more specifically, the disclosure.207 The centrality of and
focus on disclosed content makes sense when viewing the informing
function as the patent medium’s sole function. However, the disclosure—and more broadly, content—is not the only useful constituent
in the patent system; when considering the patent medium as having
a communicating function as well, its role becomes much richer than
disclosure alone. Various content and meta-data within the patent
system comprises relevant components of the patent medium, including file wrappers, reexamination or invalidation proceedings,
PTO announcements, pledges, licensing, the ‘Patent’ and ‘Patent
Pending’ symbols,208 and patent statistics. For instance, file wrappers—an extra-disclosure element—hold both content and metadata regarding the examination of a patent application, chiefly PTOapplicant correspondences.209 The content of file wrappers bears
high value for competitors who wish to better understand the applicant’s technological achievements and struggles, which may be beneficial for uses like challenging a patent.210 Note that in such cases,
the sender of the message is not necessarily the applicant; the sender
in a file wrapper may be the PTO, highlighting issues regarding the
invention for others or anchoring the applicant’s position for future
proceedings.211
207

See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 287, 292.
209
See supra note 153.
210 Assad Abbas et al., A Literature Review on the State-of-the-Art in Patent Analysis, 37
WORLD PAT. INFO. 3 (2014) (“a file wrapper include[s] information, such as first
amendment, rejection, interference, and the original application”); Alan C. Marcoa et al.,
Patent Claims and Patent Scope, 48 RES. POL’Y 1, 7 (2019) (“file wrapper (alternatively,
image file wrapper or IFW) of a published application comprises the full documentation of
each individual application, including the initial filing, office actions by examiners, claim
amendments, disclosures, etc.”).
211 An applicant who makes narrowing amendments to the application during the
prosecution process is precluded from broadening the claims’ scope later to cover subject
matter ceded by the amendments. This doctrine is known as “prosecution history estoppel”
or “file wrapper estoppel.” See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
208
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For the importance of meta-data in patent communication, consider the example of the obsessive engagement of political and business entities with the number of patents to outline a hierarchy. The
patent hierarchy discourse is a part of wider technological and economic conversations, especially when comparing among superpowers (e.g., the national number of patents)212 and multinational companies (e.g., the size of a “patent portfolio,” or the collection of all
patents a firm holds).213 With such actors, patent statistics—metadata derived from the patent space—are an important communicative element, serving as both an instrument for and an indicator of
such hierarchy.214
Importantly, the network paradigm does not reject the informing
function. To the contrary, the network paradigm adopts the informing function and supplements the communicating function. Therefore, previous research regarding the informing function, such as
disclosure literature, remains highly valuable, and the network paradigm relies on its insights.215 In other words, while rejecting neither
the informing function nor the importance of disclosure in patent

Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002). There are some exceptions to this doctrine; for instance,
when the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable technology at the time of application or
when the rationale underlying a narrowing amendment bears only a tangential relation to
the equivalent in question. See id. at 740–41.
212 See Cohen, supra note 7; Yu Xiaoming, China Patent Applications Hit Record 1.54
Million in 2018, CHINADAILY (Oct. 16, 2019, 1:54 PM), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
a/201910/16/WS5da6b0a9a310cf3e35570d07.html [https://perma.cc/JEQ8-BYQQ].
213 See Louis Columbus, The Most Innovative Tech Companies Based on Patent
Analytics, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
louiscolumbus/2019/12/15/the-most-innovative-tech-companies-based-on-patentanalytics/ (last visited May 10, 2022); Susan Decker, Huawei Has 56,492 Patents and It’s
Not Afraid to Use Them, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2019, 1:07 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/huawei-has-56-492-patents-andit-s-not-afraid-to-use-them (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
214
WIPO, Facts and Figures (2022), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/infogdocs/en/
ipfactsandfigures/ [https://perma.cc/W926-XDPM]; Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as
Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1661 (1990) (explaining why
patent statistics, despite the difficulties that arise in their use, are good economic
indicators); Sadao Nagaoka et al., Patent Statistics as an Innovation Indicator, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1083 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan
Rosenberg eds., 2010) (reexamining Griliches’ model of patent statistics as economic
indicators).
215 See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 H
ARV.
J.L. & TECH. 401, 444–45 (2010); Fromer, supra note 1; Rantanen, supra note 1.

2022]

THE PATENT MEDIUM

899

communication, the network paradigm points at the significance of
other (overlooked) contents beyond disclosure and at meta-data in
patent communication.216
2. “The How”: Multi-Directional Flow
The bulletin-board paradigm comprises a linear communication
with messages flowing from the applicant to groups from the larger
public, but not in the reverse direction.217 In contrast, the organizing
principle of the network paradigm this Article suggests is multi-directionality. The multi-directional flow recognizes the potential and
importance of a feedback loop in the patent space. Such a feedback
mechanism is interactive and simultaneous, as it allows parallel actions by different players.
One can see a communication flow in the opposite direction—
namely, from the public to the applicant/patentee—in the case of
patent reviews. Patent reviews are a genre of online writing that resembles a consumer review.218 A tech-journalist updates the public
about a patent application or a newly granted patent and reviews the
invention at hand; such a review is usually open for public discussion, allowing others to scrutinize, praise, criticize, or mock the invention.219 Beside the ideas of creating a buzz or encouraging the
establishment of a community, such comments may be useful to applicants, patentees, or other players in the patent space.220 Namely,

216

Such as file wrappers, patent reviews, patents statistics, patent continuations. See
supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
218 See GizmoChina-Patents, supra note 193; Patently Apple, supra note 193; Patently
Mobile, supra note 193.
219 See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 199.
220
See JANELLE BARLOW & CLAUS MØLLER, A COMPLAINT IS A GIFT: RECOVERING
CUSTOMER LOYALTY WHEN THINGS GO WRONG 71 (2d ed. 2008) (describing customer
reviews as “a most valuable asset” firm can receive to improve and offering methods to do
so); Nikolay Archak et al., Deriving the Pricing Power of Product Features by Mining
Consumer Reviews, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1485, 1488 (2011) (discussing the high value of
consumer reviews and demonstrating how to use them for consumers’ preferences and
predictive modeling of sales); Minqing Hu & Bing Liu, Mining and Summarizing Customer
Reviews, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 168, 168 (2004) (proposing techniques to process customer
reviews).
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in such cases a message flows in a different direction than the traditional, uni-directional patentee-to-public flow.221
Another instance of multi-directional flow is the continuation
practice under U.S. patent law.222 A continuing patent application is
an application that follows, and claims priority to, a previously-filed
application.223 The continuation procedure allows for discourse: an
applicant files for a patent; the pubic and market then react to this
application in certain ways; after which the applicant uses continuations to account for such reactions; and the public can react again.
Such a conversation is evident in plenty of incidents. For example,
Rambus, a company engaged in chip interface technologies, repeatedly filed continuations that successively captured developments in
the field of synchronous dynamic random-access memory
(“SDRAM”).224 Courts and the International Trade Commission
discussed Rambus’s practice.225 There is a conversation—not onesided announcements—that transpires through the patent medium.
The examples of patent reviews and continuation practices show
more than just the different directions that messages take in the patent medium— they demonstrate the various trajectories a message
can travel from a sender to a recipient. An individual (e.g., a potential consumer or a tech-fan) can acquire familiarity with an invention
which is under patent examination through an online patent review.226 Alternatively, a recipient may discover this information by
noticing the invention elsewhere (e.g., a shop), carrying a “Patent
Pending” indication.227 In both communication routes, the message
travels from an applicant to an individual; however, the route each
case takes is different, specifically in terms of the intermediary that

221

See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2015).
223
See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2015).
224 David Alban, Rambus v. Infineon: Patent Disclosures in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 309, 320–22 (2004).
225 See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 330 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682–88 (E.D. Va.
2004) (describing Rambus’ continuation); Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d
1081, 1084–85, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing Rambus’ continuations); Certain
Semiconductor Chips and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-753, USITC Pub.
4386 (Mar. 2013) (Final) (describing Rambus’ continuations).
226 See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
227
See supra note 208.
222
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mediates the message.228 Hence, it is unsurprising that each route
may deliver a message differently and impact the message itself,
leading to differing communications and effects.229
3. Levels of Access: Public and Private Spheres
Whereas the bulletin-board paradigm focuses only on the patent
medium’s public sphere—the public information that a patent application discloses—the network paradigm seeks to expand the view to
encompass both public and private spheres. Communication processes within the patent medium are not always transparent, yet they
comprise an integral part of patent communication. Some instances
of such private communications include an applicant’s communications with a patent attorney,230 patentee-licensee communications,231 patentee-rival communications in settling disputes,232 or applicant/patentee-PTO communications (i.e., communications that
do not reside in the prosecution file history).233
Private connections may ultimately influence patent communication, including its public sphere. For example, an applicant’s communication with her patent attorney may influence the content and
style of the patent documents, the timing of various events (e.g., applying for or abandoning a patent), and even the approval or rejection of an application.234 Other examples include the impact of a
228

In the patent review example, the reviewer delivers a direct, explicit interpretation of
the message, while in the “Patent Pending” instance, the intermediary—a mere symbol—
plays its role in a subtle way.
229 This corresponds with medium theory, a widely-recognized approach in
communication studies, maintaining that the trajectory of communication impacts the
message itself. See DERRICK DE KERCKHOVE, THE ALPHABET AND THE BRAIN: THE
LATERALIZATION OF WRITING 1 (Derrick de Kerckhove & Charles J. Lumsden eds., 1988);
HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS 7, 28, 216 (2007); HAROLD A. INNIS, THE
BIAS OF COMMUNICATION (2d ed. 1951); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA
7–23, 65–67 (1964); JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, NO SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF
ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 73–114 (1986); NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING
OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 66–76 (1985).
230 See Spalding, supra note 147.
231 See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 147.
232
See Patterson, supra note 147.
233 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 724.02.
234
Christina Koller & Bernd Ebersberger, How Do Characteristics of Patent Attorneys
Influence Patent Quality?, 15 DRUID 1, 4–5, 10–12 (2015), https://conference.druid.dk/
acc_papers/0if3bt5fal3k8xlorvdg0f2bn23h.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L6W-KNUJ]; Sevim
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confidential patent license and dispute resolution on the market;235
such licenses and settlements are usually confidential (namely, a private sphere), and cause other players in the patent space to play in a
“blind” market (i.e., a public sphere).236 Once we grasp that patent
communication is comprised of more than just public channels, we
better comprehend the actual complexity of patent communication.
For instance, characterizing the major elements in the (private) applicant-patent agent communication may unveil various considerations in formulating a patent application besides obtaining broad patent rights, like a firm’s intention to lie low and avoid opposition or
an agent’s desire to maintain a high success rate. Analyzing this private channel allows for better understanding of the public channel—
the published patent documents (e.g., patent disclosure, claims, and
file wrappers)—as well as the environment in which applicant-patent agent communications occur. The applicant-patent agent communication is just an example, and the point is that fully understanding the patent medium requires consideration of both the public and
private spheres.
Importantly, this Article does not argue that all patent communications must be public. There are various justifications for confidentiality on many occasions in patent communications such as patent agent-client privilege.237 However, assimilating the possible effects of private channels on public channels (and vice versa), and
subsequently the influence on patent communication in general, facilitates our comprehension of the patent medium.
4. “The Who”: Multiple Participants
The bulletin-board paradigm views the patent medium as a ternary complex: the applicant/patentee, the public, and the PTO. Indeed, these are the most basic participants. However, a closer look
at the patent space reveals that additional agents take part in the

Süzeroğlu-Melchiors et al., Friend or Foe? The Effects of Patent Attorney Use on Filing
Strategy vis-a-vis the Effects of Firm Experience, 55 MGMT. DECISION 1122 (2017)
(examining strategic considerations taken by patent attorneys concerning patent filing
decisions).
235
See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 147; Patterson, supra note 147.
236 See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 147; Patterson, supra note 147, at 827.
237
See Spalding, supra note 147.
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discourse and influence messages, including licensees, legal parties
(e.g., patent challengers or parties requesting to reexamine a patent),
courts, patent attorneys, journalists, consumers, tech-fans, organizations (e.g., WIPO, WTO, OECD), political entities, and other jurisdictions. The internet resulted in two major changes that further expanded the circle of participants: broader availability and cost-reduction.238 The meaning of geographic distance, information volume, and communication speed has changed.239 Moreover, the internet reduced information-related costs, such as searching, replicating, and distributing.240 These changes allow for more voices, placing various communicative deeds within the reach of myriad individuals.
In this context, intermediaries deserve particular attention. Intermediaries are participants who transport, reproduce, and otherwise
process messages.241 Theories of mass communication focus on the
significant role that intermediaries often play in the communication
process.242 Whereas traditional intermediary theory specifically addresses how individuals receive news, Karine Nahon has suggested
applying the theory to all information.243 Intermediary activity

238

See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 54–56 (2006) (describing the changes brought by
the digitally networked environment); DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES,
MEDIA/SOCIETY: INDUSTRIES, IMAGES, AND AUDIENCES 94–101 (6th ed. 2019)
(characterizing the internet as an “open, decentralized platform, accessible to anyone,” with
a structure “designed to give users considerable control over their experience.” Moreover,
the internet is a global system, “whose governance structure transcends the regulatory reach
of any single country.”).
239
See BENKLER, supra note 238; CROTEAU & HOYNES, supra note 238.
240 See BENKLER, supra note 238; CROTEAU & HOYNES, supra note 238; Paul DiMaggio
et al., Social Implications of the Internet, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 307, 313, 323 (2001) (“By
dramatically reducing the cost of the replication and distribution of information, the
Internet has the potential to create arenas for more voices than any other previous
communication medium.”).
241 JAMES WATSON & ANNE HILL, DICTIONARY OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES
178 (8th ed. 2012).
242 See Elihu Katz, The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on a
Hypothesis, 21 POL. OP. Q. 61 (1957) (suggesting that the flow of information and
influence from the mass media to their audiences involves two steps: from the media to
certain individuals and from them to the public).
243 See Karine Barzilai-Nahon, Gatekeeping: A Critical Review, 43 A
NN. REV. INFO. SCI.
& TECH. 1 (2009); Karine Barzilai-Nahon, Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A
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relates to both the structural and content-based architecture of information with which actors come into contact.244 Intermediaries can
decide what messages others see, in what context, and under which
conditions.245 The intermediation functions include selecting, adding, withholding, displaying, channeling, shaping, manipulating, repeating, timing, localizing, integrating, disregarding, and deleting
information.246 Different combinations of such functions lead to various archetypes of intermediaries: gatekeepers, directors, regulators,
performers, recorders, editors, integrators, representatives, reproducers, and carriers.247
Applying the two-step flow model—a longstanding theory of
communication studies and sociology248—to the patent medium underscores the importance and power of intermediaries in patent communication. The two-step flow model posits that most people form
their opinions under the influence of opinion leaders.249 Opinion
leaders are super-active users who interpret messages for other,
lower-end users.250 Typically, opinion leaders have expertise; hence,
they are held in high esteem by lower-end users.251 Opinion leaders
facilitate the diffusion of communications.252 Given their more literate understanding of certain topics, opinion leaders explain and
spread messages to others, though not necessarily in accordance

Framework for Exploring Information Control, 59 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
1493, 1493 (2008).
244 See Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of
Internet Intermediaries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783, 787 (2016).
245
See Barzilai-Nahon, Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for
Exploring Information Control, supra note 243, at 1496–97.
246
See id.
247 See Foulger, supra note 96.
248
See KATZ & LAZARSFELD, supra note 17; LAUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23–25; Katz,
supra note 242.
249 See ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 467–69 (1957);
Leisa Reinecke Flynn et al., Opinion Leaders and Opinion Seekers: Two New
Measurement Scales, 24 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 137, 137 (1996).
250
See WATSON & HILL, supra note 241, at 214.
251 See id.
252
Ronald. S. Burt, The Social Capital of Opinion Leaders. 566 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 37 (1999) (elaborating on the role of opinion leaders in diffusing
innovation-related information).
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with a sender’s intention.253 Examples of opinion leaders are teachers, attorneys, and media professionals.254
The notion of opinion leadership suggests that a major part of
communication depends neither on the sender nor on actual content,
but rather on intermediaries.255 The role of opinion leaders in the
patent medium is particularly essential because patent communication most often requires a certain degree of expertise, be it of a legal
or technological orientation.256
Incorporating the two-step flow into the patent medium paradigm enables us to comprehend ideas and arguments in patent literature that are currently hypothetical and vague. Long, Asay, and Anderson have argued that patentees use patent disclosures and pledges
to signal to consumers and investors.257 However, a large proportion
of recipients—be they consumers, inventors, or other groups—do
not actually read patent disclosures, pledges, or other patent documents.258 Someone mediates the message for them; intermediaries,
such as patent experts and attorneys,259 journalists and bloggers,260
scientists,261 and activists,262 act as opinion leaders. None of the
253

Annika Bergström & Maria Jervelycke Belfrage, News in Social Media, 6 DIGIT.
JOURNALISM 583, 593 (2018); Xiaofei Zhang & Dahai Dong, Ways of Identifying the
Opinion Leaders in Virtual Communities, 3 INT’L J. OF BUS. & MGMT. 21, 21–22 (2008);
Robert V. Kozinets et al., Lost in Translation: The Social Shaping of Marketing
Messaging, 6 MKTG. INTEL. REV. 22 (2014) (maintaining that during dissemination of a
message, its meaning and value are changing).
254 See Matthew Nisbet, Ambassadors for Science: Harnessing the Power of OpinionLeaders Across Communities, 42 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER 30, 31 (2018).
255 See Katz, supra note 242, at 75–78.
256
Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 L. & LITERATURE
163, 183 (2014) (arguing that only patent experts possess the necessary skills to navigate
and comprehend patent documents, and specifically patent claims).
257
See supra notes 49–76, and accompanying text.
258 See Burk & Reyman, supra note 256, at 185 (“[patent-related] practices are mediated
by an expert community that authors, defines, enforces, and executes the social meaning
of the patent.”).
259 Mainly serving as intermediaries between applicants or patentees and PTOs, Courts,
or legal parties. See Burk & Reyman, supra note 258, at 178–80.
260 See sources cited supra notes 5–9, 193.
261
For instance, see generally Sadhana Chitale et al., Understanding the Basics of
Patenting, 38 NATURE BIOTECH. 263 (2020). Also, scientific literature (such as Nature
Biotechnology) has a regular column that mediates patents to scientists. See e.g.,
Xenotransplantation, 18 NATURE BIOTECH. 418, 418 (2000).
262
See supra notes 198–200.
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aforementioned studies have elaborated on intermediation, despite
their indispensability within patent communications.263 Without intermediation, one cannot understand how patent communication (including patent signals) transpires. The intermediation’s considerable
significance in communication processes requires us to consider intermediaries when examining patent communications. Indeed, limiting our view to the oversimplified triangle of patentee-PTO-public
and ignoring various go-betweens may be misleading.
A caveat is due: the bulletin-board paradigm is not incompatible
with the existence of multiple players, but its focus is on the basic
ternary complex. This approach disregards communication and
players that are peripheral to the patentee-PTO-public linkage. The
bulletin-board paradigm does not object to the existence of a printing house, editor, publisher, or other players located between the
sender and the recipient. Nevertheless, this paradigm tends to overlook the intermediation function due to the very nature of a bulletin
board’s focus on content. By contrast, the network paradigm aims at
the bigger picture, incorporating players that are not at the forefront
but still influence the message. Moreover, even when the bulletinboard paradigm acknowledges a peripheral player, it is not in the
context of communication, but rather views such a player as a technician. For instance, the bulletin-board paradigm might consider patent attorneys, but only the context of meeting legal standards or
prevailing in lawsuits. Thus, it explores these players’ legal functions but not their communicative ones.
5. A Repeated Game: Continuous Communication
The patent system is not a single-shot game but more often a
repeated one. Namely, it is a game of many iterations, in which players engage in continuous communication, with each interchange affected by previous actions and affecting future actions.264

263

See supra note 80.
GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS 1–10 (2007).

264

AND
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Under the bulletin-board paradigm, once a patent is published
(or rejected by the PTO before publication), the game is over.265 A
new patent application means a new game with new information.
Although some have discussed patent portfolios,266 they approached
them with a commercial orientation and did not focus on communicative aspects. Namely, from a communication perspective, each patent stands on its own.267 However, the network paradigm grasps
communication as a continuous, ongoing process with an indeterminate number of stages. Even when a message concerns a particular
patent, it is merely a segment of a more extensive communication
process.
The continuation practice described above268 provides a good
example to demonstrate the notion of ongoing communication. The
continuation practice enables parties to play an ongoing game by
reacting to other players or changes. Moderna’s mRNA patents
demonstrate such dynamics: Moderna filed the key patents for its
mRNA vaccine years ago, which make no mention of COVID-19
since it did not exist.269 Yet today, Moderna is filing continuations
that specifically cover COVID-19-related developments.270
Moderna is able to better react to changes (in addition to securing
its commercial interests) through the continuation practice.271

265

As communication is linear and sender-centric, namely, no feedback by other players
(except for the official PTO as a gatekeeper) is taken into account. See supra notes 139–
43.
266 See Michele Grimaldi et al., The Patent Portfolio Value Analysis: A New Framework
to Leverage Patent Information for Strategic Technology Planning, 94 TECH. FORECASTING
SOC. CHANGE 286, 286 (2015); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
267
See supra note 265.
268 See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2015).
269
See U.S. Patent No. 10,272,150 (filed July 20, 2018).
270 See U.S. Patent No. 10,702,600 (filed Feb. 28, 2020).
271 See generally Bruce A. Kaser, Patent Application Recycling: How Continuations
Impact Patent Quality & What the USPTO Is Doing About It, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 426 (2006) (explaining how continuations allow patentees to ‘recycle’
unsuccessful applications instead of being rejected); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat,
Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181 (2008) (maintaining that
continuations is a powerful tool for applicants, enabling them to overcome anticipated
rejections); Cecil D. Quillen & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 13 (2001)
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Namely, continuations are one component in the patent space that
enable a repeated game by allowing for auxiliary communication
that transpires within a specific context of previous moves in the
repeated patent game.
Viewing the patent medium as a repeated game makes sense in
light of empirical data. Most patentees are frequent applicants who
engage repeatedly in the patent system.272 Clearly, other players in
the patent space—patent agents and attorneys, PTOs, courts, scientists, competitors, journalists, investors, and consumers—also repeatedly participate in the patent game.273
Game theorists have extensively studied communication in repeated games.274 Based on their approach, applying the network paradigm—espousing the notion of patent communication as a repeated
game—to the patent system enables a better understanding of the
relations and actions within the patent space. A repeated game renders the patent system an arena with features such as cooperation,275
reward-and-punishment,276 and reputation.277 For instance, in
(arguing that, thanks to the continuation practice, applicants can increase the grant rate to
roughly ninety-seven percent).
272
See Patent Assignment Dataset, USPTO (June 25, 2021, 12:23 PM),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patentassignment-dataset [https://perma.cc/BB6D-7FUY]; Francesca Arnaboldi & Peter Claeys,
Banks and Patents in the U.S., in INNOVATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: A DUAL AMBIGUITY
70, 80–81 (Anne-Laure Mention & Marko Torkkeli eds., 2014); Hazel V. J. Moir, Who
Benefits? An Empirical Analysis of Australian and US Patent Ownership 10–11 (Ctr. for
Governance of Knowledge and Dev., Working Paper, 2008).
273 Patent agents, PTOs, and courts are frequent players in the legal arena; scientists and
competitors are frequent players in the technological arena; journalists, investors and
consumers are frequent players in the economic-financial arena.
274 See Antonio A. Arechar et. al, “I’m Just a Soul Whose Intentions Are Good”: The
Role of Communication in Noisy Repeated Games, 104 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 726, 726
(2017); Elchanan Ben-Porath & Michael Kahneman, Communication in Repeated Games
with Costly Monitoring, 44 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 227, 227 (2003).
275 See Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, Communication and Cooperation in Repeated
Games, 14 THEORETICAL ECON. 513, 513 (2019); Pedro Dal Bó & Guillaume R. Fréchette,
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 411, 411 (2011).
276
See Matthias Sutter et al., Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional
Choice in Social Dilemma Situations, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 1540, 1540 (2010); Julian
Wright, Punishment Strategies in Repeated Games: Evidence from Experimental Markets,
82 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 91, 92 (2013).
277
See MAILATH & SAMUELSON, supra note 264, at 459.
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iterated games of unknown rounds (such as the patent medium), the
preferred strategy is not a Nash strategy but a socially optimal strategy.278
With reputation systems and reward-and-punishment methods,
the network paradigm expounds patent communication as a viable
strategy rather than merely an obligation imposed by the patent bargain. Moreover, unlike the classical view of a single-shot patent
game in which deceiving and concealing are favorable strategies,
the network paradigm—through the repeated game notion—reveals
the coexisting incentives for cooperation, trust, and honesty among
participants, more often than one might assume.279
For example, incorporating reputation systems and reward-andpunishment methods into patent communication enables us to better
rationalize licensing, cross-licensing, and patent pledges.280 Licensing and pledging of valuable patents may sometime look irrational
under a single-shot game view, as parties (seem to) act against their
interests.281 However, licensing or pledging a precious asset (like
patents related to COVID-19)282 makes perfect sense when considering the repeated game notion.283 One might strategically license or
cross-license patent rights to others—namely, play cooperatively—
as there are reasonable chances the former would need the latter in
the future.284 In addition, at times, patentees must manifest solidarity
278

See Robert J. Aumann, Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games,
in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES 287, 323 (1959).
279 For elaboration on game theory in the context of patent law (and intellectual property,
in general), see Ted Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordination in Intellectual
Property, SAN DIEGO LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1).
280
For more information on cross-licensing, see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY & THE
ECONOMY 119, 129 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). For more information on patent
pledges, see supra note 27.
281
As in the case of licensing or pledging a highly valuable patented invention to others
instead of fully exploiting its commercial value.
282 See supra note 159.
283 See Oliver Baldus, Patent-Based Cooperation Effects, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC.
111, 114 (2010); Mukesh Eswaran, Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a
Facilitating Device, 27 CAN. J. ECON. 689, 690 (1994).
284 See Aumann, supra note 278; MAILATH & SAMUELSON, supra note 264, at 2–6; Dal
Bó et al., The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental
Evidence, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 411 (2011) (demonstrating that under certain
circumstances, a cooperative behavior in repeated games leads to an equilibrium).
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with the public, including voluntarily pledging a promising patent,
as part of long-term planning regarding public image, branding, and
consumerism.285 The repeated game concept suggests that such acts
hold a communicative value, reflecting features such as cooperation,
solidarity, or decency; and as a part of a continuous communication,
they could be of high value for later stages of the game.
***
This Section presented gaps between the bulletin-board paradigm and the network paradigm, and hence, may erroneously provide the impression that these are two opposite spheres. Indeed, at
times, the bulletin-board paradigm and the network paradigm can
lead to different results. However, in most circumstances, the network paradigm does not contradict the bulletin board’s view but rather sharpens and illuminates features of the patent medium that
have been overlooked.286
Further, the two paradigms share four communicative features
underlying the very core of the patent system. This Article defines
them as the trivial communicative traits: (1) identification; (2) credibility; (3) context; and (4) interactivity.
“Identification” refers to the fact that a patent specifies the identity of players, including the applicant, the inventor,287 the patent
owner, the patent attorney, and the PTO.288 Such official identification reveals the communicator’s identity.289 From a communication
perspective, this is valuable information, especially in our global village.290 Notwithstanding that the patent medium falls short of
285

See Aumann, supra note 278; MAILATH & SAMUELSON, supra note 264, at 2–6; Dal
Bó et al., supra note 284.
286
See supra Part IV.B.
287 See supra note 79.
288
These details are codified in a universal indication system called “Committee on
WIPO Standards.” Standard St.9, in HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY INFORMATION
AND DOCUMENTATION 3.9.1 (June 2013), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
standards/en/pdf/03-09-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4859-EMAB].
289 See id.
290
Note that the assignee is not necessarily the current owner, as assignment need not be
recorded in the PTO. See BRENDA J. ALLEN, DIFFERENCE MATTERS: COMMUNICATING
SOCIAL IDENTITY xi (2d ed. 2004); Michael L. Hecht, 2002—A Research Odyssey: Toward
the Development of a Communication Theory of Identity, 60 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 76,
77–82 (1993).
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disclosing all participants’ identities (e.g., licensees), even a partial,
official list has considerable value.
Credibility is the believability and integrity of a message.291
Credibility affects the extent to which others are willing to accept a
message and treat it seriously.292 Various features in patent law confer credibility:293 professional, external examination of applications;294 duties of candor and good faith;295 the doctrine of estoppel;296 the rule against recapture;297 patent misuse throughout postpatent licensing;298 the marking statute;299 and the fact that a patent
can be exposed to invalidation after being granted.300 Filtering
mechanisms in the patent system, monetary (e.g., fees) and bureaucratic (e.g., patent renewal) alike, further enhance credibility.
Context encapsulates the idea that the patent system was designed to communicate invention-oriented messages, and so the patent medium inherently operates in a professional-technical context.
Legal concepts such as prior art,301 enablement,302 drawings,303 the

291

See Ortwin Renn & Debra Levine, Credibility and Trust in Risk Communication, in
COMMUNICATING RISKS TO THE PUBLIC 175, 175 (Roger E. Kasperson & Pieter Jan M.
Stallen eds., 1990).
292
See id.; Charles A. O’Reilly & Karlene H. Roberts, Relationships Among Components
of Credibility and Communication Behaviors in Work Units, 61 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 99,
99 (1976).
293 See Holbrook, supra note 12, at 576–79, 597–600 (contemplating how patents can act
as a modes of communication regarding non-technical information based on the imprimatur
of the government, specifically in cases of morally questionable inventions); Long, supra
note 12, at 637.
294 See Georgine M. Pion & Mark W. Lipsey, Public Attitudes Toward Science and
Technology: What Have the Surveys Told Us?, 45 PUB. OP. Q. 303, 303 (1981).
295
See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 11.303(a)–(e), 11.804(c), 42.11 (2012).
296 The doctrine prevents patentees from communicating a message in a certain way visà-vis the PTO and subsequently communicating it differently once the patent is granted.
See Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1886); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002).
297 See In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Mostafazadeh, 643
F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
298 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964); Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576
U.S. 446, 449 (2015).
299
35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
300 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(b)(2)–(3), 302, 311–19.
301
See supra note 134.
302 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
303
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.165, 1.84 (2004).
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standard of a person having ordinary skill in the art
(“PHOSITA”),304 the competence requirement for practicing before
the PTO,305 and the Internationally agreed Numbers for the Identification of Data (“INID”) system306 are prominent representations of
the professional-technical context of the patent system, imparting an
ambiance of an intricate system designed for experts.
The patent system is inherently interactive,307 as every patent interacts with previous innovations (i.e., prior art), with the patent
granted only if the invention proves novel and nontrivial (i.e., novelty and non-obviousness).308 Interactivity is specifically manifested
in the cross-reference and background sections of patent documents.309
To summarize the points made thus far, Table 1 summarizes the
features of the bulletin-board and the network paradigms, as well the
trivial communicative traits.

Table 1: Features of the bulletin-board and network paradigms
Table 1 underscores that the bulletin-board paradigm resembles
the linear model, whereas the network paradigm is closer to the
304

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004).
305 37 C.F.R. § 11.101 (2013).
306 See supra note 288.
307
See Sheizaf Rafaeli, Interactivity: from New Media to Communication, in ADVANCING
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE: MERGING MASS AND INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES 110, 110–31
(Robert P. Hawkins et al. eds., 1988).
308 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103.
309
37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b) (2021).
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transactional model.310 As described above, over time, communication theorists moved from a linear to a transactional mindset, as they
found the latter better reflecting a real-world scheme of communication.311 Likewise, this Article proposes that the legislature adopt
the new, more comprehensive network paradigm, which coincides
with similar, more general insights in communication studies.
Besides theoretical support from communication studies, there
are also practical reasons as to why the network paradigm is superior. The following Part argues that the network paradigm offers
more than just a better description of the patent system; it holds potent explanatory power, much fuller and stronger than the bulletinboard paradigm’s power, and hence facilitates our understanding of
the patent system.312 Therefore, this Article’s proposal is anchored
not only in theoretical reasons or parallel moves in a different discipline; this new paradigm also provides practical tools to advance
new understandings in patent law.
B. The Network Paradigm as an Explanatory Tool
This Section demonstrates the potential of the network paradigm
as an explanatory tool using real-world situations. It summons again
the three sample phenomena presented in Part III and applies the
network paradigm to them, illustrating its fine explanatory power in
each of the different patent timeline phases.313 This Section shows
that the network paradigm succeeds where the bulletin board fails.
1. Rethinking Patent Pledging
The bulletin-board paradigm encounters three major difficulties
when explaining pledging (i.e., waiving patent rights fully or partially). First, whereas the bulletin-board paradigm focuses on the
formal patent communication—particularly patent disclosure—
pledging is an unofficial channel.314 Second, while the bulletin-

310

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
312
Using set theory terminology: the network and the bulletin-board paradigms are not
disjointed sets but, rather, intersect at some elements.
313
See supra Part III.B.
314 As pledging is not an official procedure in patent law. See supra notes 157–58 and
accompanying text.
311
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board paradigm assumes that patent communications transpire only
under the obligation of the patent bargain, pledging is a non-mandatory act of patent communication.315 Finally, the bulletin-board paradigm perceives patent communication as having a unilateral purpose of benefiting the public; yet the unavoidable conclusion that
pledging must also benefit patentees contradicts this approach and
suggests that pledges serve multilateral purposes. The network paradigm, on the other hand, offers a fuller explanation of patent pledging and addresses these three issues using two elements of the network paradigm: the communicating function and the repeated game
approach.316
Applying the communicating function to patent pledging resolves the issue of pledges as an unofficial, non-PTO-mediated
channel. According to the communicating function, the network paradigm does not limit its view to patent disclosure, and more generally to official channels.317 Instead of formal information broadcasting, the network paradigm depicts patent communication as a discourse.318 Thus, patentees communicate with other players in nontraditional manners—not exclusively through official patent documents, but also through various patent-related instruments, including pledges.319
The discourse notion is also helpful in facilitating the second
problem—pledging as non-mandatory communication—and perhaps a more general question: what is the explanation for the very
existence of voluntary actions in the patent space? A discourse, as
opposed to formal-technical exchange, is not subject to mandatory
communication. Players can and do voluntarily participate in a discourse and not only when they are obliged to, but because they have
an interest in doing so.320 Put differently, the network paradigm posits that on top of the mandatory legal-technical communication,
there are voluntary communications transpiring through the patent
medium.
315
316
317
318
319
320

Pledges are voluntary. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts IV.B.1, 5.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
Other examples are patent reviews and patent statistics. See supra Part IV.A.1.
See generally Barnlund, supra note 20.
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The pledging discourse is an example of such voluntary communication. Patentees usually declare ideological grounds for their
pledges, such as pledging “in the spirit of the open-source movement” designed to enhance competition and innovation321 or to help
humanity.322 But are there other, more down-to-earth interests in
participating in the pledging discourse? The repeated game feature,
another central element of the network paradigm, suggests a positive
answer: in a continuous interaction like patent communication,
waiving rights (or other ostensibly altruistic deeds) makes much
sense as a strategic move. For instance, patent pledging leads, naturally, to a positive public image for the pledger. Therefore, it may
be worthwhile to pledge a patent at one stage of the game to evade
sharp public criticism or to commercialize (the same or other) inventions more effectively at future stages. Such considerations are
particularly relevant at times when solidarity is needed and the public is hypercritical, such as during crises—indeed, this analysis perfectly coincides with the COVID-19 pledges.323 Namely, pledges do
more than merely inform about legal changes (e.g., non-enforcement of patent rights); a pledge is a more complex, multipurpose
discourse. Tesla’s patent pledge324 is one instance that demonstrates
the discourse-like nature of the patent space. Tesla’s pledge drew
much public praise for its (allegedly) altruistic and brave move.325
Such a pledge is an additional step in enhancing the hype around
Tesla and its founder Elon Musk’s business and supporting their
unique public image.326
321

See Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, supra note 158; Musk, supra note 158;
Toyota Opens Its Fuel Cell Vehicle Patents for Free Use, TOYOTA (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://global.toyota/en/detail/4663648 [https://perma.cc/8ABR-9TC9].
322 See Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters During the COVID-19
Pandemic, supra note 159; About Us, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/W2WF-37CR].
323
See supra note 159.
324 See Musk, supra note 158.
325 See Matthew Rimmer, Elon Musk’s Open Innovation: Tesla, Intellectual Property,
and Climate Change, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLEAN ENERGY 515, 515 (Matthew
Rimmer ed., 2018) (reviewing Tesla’s pledge as a revolutionizing move toward open
innovation). Musk made sure to remind everyone of Tesla’s pledge again. See
@ElonMusk, TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/
1091080660100440065 [https://perma.cc/5QKY-WRC8].
326 Chris
Wilks et al., Brand Analysis: Elon Musk, BRAND EXTRACT,
https://www.brandextract.com/Insights/Podcast-Episodes/Brand-Analysis-Elon-Musk/
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From a broad perspective, introducing the repeated game notion
highlights that patent communication holds more than the unilateral
purpose of informing the public about legal or technical issues. Patent communication has multilateral purposes that encourage discourse, potentially benefiting all participants.327 For instance, pledging can promote public relations (i.e., benefits the pledgor), serve as
advertisements (i.e., benefits the pledgor and consumers), call for
collaborations (i.e., benefits the pledgor and potential partners), encourage innovation (i.e., benefits competitors and the public), and
so forth.328
Patent pledging discourse can also be driven by other players
rather than the pledger itself. For example, commentators,329 politicians,330 and competitors331 might initiate or enhance the pledging
discourse. The fact that various players, not only pledgers, can initiate and react to a pledging discourse is also explained by the network paradigm, mainly through two elements: multi-directionality
(i.e., that patent communication can flow in different directions) and
multiple active participants (i.e., the applicant/patentee is not the
only active participant within the patent medium).332 Moreover, patent pledges clearly reveal the importance of intermediaries—a critical point in the network paradigm—as pledges are not part of the
formal patent documents, and thus get published through the intervention of expert intermediaries such as commentators and journalists, and not the conventional PTO intermediary.333
[https://perma.cc/HVA5-W4XP]; David Adkin, The Evolution of Elon Musk: The Good,
The Bad, and the Ugly, ADALO, https://www.adalo.com/posts/the-evolution-of-elon-muskthe-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly [https://perma.cc/A9TD-7CGN].
327
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
328 See Vertinsky, supra note 165, at 1381–82.
329
See About Us, supra note 322.
330 See Amy Maxmen, In Shock Move, US Backs Waiving Patents on COVID Vaccines,
NATURE (2021); Members Discuss TRIPS Waiver, LDC Transition Period and Green Tech
Role for Small Business, WTO (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news21_e/trip_11mar21_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A9TD-7CGN]; Covid: US Backs Waiver
on Vaccine Patents to Boost Supply, BBC (May 6, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-us-canada-57004302 [https://perma.cc/AN83-QJE8].
331
See Rimmer, supra note 325, at 533–37 (examining how Tesla’s rivals have reacted
to Tesla’s pledge); Toyota Opens Its Fuel Cell Vehicle Patents for Free Use, supra note
321.
332 See supra Part IV.A.2, 4.
333
See supra notes 158–59.
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2. Rethinking Early Publication
Applying the bulletin-board paradigm to the case of early publication leaves two unresolved issues. The common assumption
would predict that applicants would postpone publication as much
as possible. However, applicants instead request to publish before
their deadlines.334 Also, the bulletin-board paradigm maintains that
patent communication takes place to inform about technological and
legal matters.335 However, early publication, by definition, publicizes material that has not yet been approved by the PTO, and thus
may contain irrelevant or wrong information.336 So, how do we explain the common practice of early publication? To address these
issues, this Part harnesses the power of the network paradigm, specifically three of its elements: the communicating function, multidirectionality, and multiple participants.337
A fundamental difference exists between the two paradigms: the
bulletin board conceptualizes publication (and generally, patent
communication) as a means—that is, publishing solely for the purpose of attaining patent rights.338 In contrast, the network paradigm
perceives of patent communication as an independent end.339 This
conclusion is derived from the communicating function element,
drawing a theoretical distinction between the bulletin-board paradigm and the network paradigm. In particular, the former grasps patent communication as the price for patent rights, while the latter has
a more complex understanding of patent communication. Specifically, such communication sometimes comprises a burden, sometimes a prize, and frequently a bit of both. Adopting the network
paradigm’s approach allows for a better explanation of the patent
system, as the practice of early publication shows. Indeed, applicants will not gain patent rights as a result of requesting early publication, but that is not their goal. Early publication serves other interests, such as misleading competitors, creating a buzz in the capital

334
335
336
337
338
339

Glaeser & Landsman, supra note 25.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
See Parts IV.B.1–2, 4 respectively.
See supra Part III.A.1; supra note 175.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
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market,340 and acquiring consumer feedback.341 Patent communication does not have to lead to a patent grant. Just like in the case of
patent pledging,342 there are many motives in requesting early publication, and the bulletin-board paradigm is looking for the wrong
one.
Regarding the issue of early publication, the other two elements—multiple participants and the multi-directionality343—are at
play as well. Given the multitude of interests and parties involved,
it does not matter if early publication conveys patent-eligible information. The goal is to communicate through the patent medium, and
the early publication practice delivers this goal. The multiplayers
element, a linchpin in the network paradigm, supports this point:
Even though the public (and traditionally, competitors and downstream inventors) may see none or merely minor legal and technical
significance in early published information, other players, such as
investors, tech-fans, and consumers, can take great interest in this
information.
But why would one prefer to communicate particularly through
the patent medium? The answer is that the patent medium contains
a rare combination of various communicative features, which give a
message of certain qualities that are hard to achieve through other
media.344 The patent medium differs from a TV commercial or a
press announcement, as patent communications—which, of course,
do not necessarily substitute other communications but usually transpire in addition to them—offer unique effects, such as credibility,
interactivity, a professional-technical context with legal orientation,
(partial) official identification of participants, and a governmentally
regulated platform.345 Each feature may be available elsewhere;
however, a medium that combines them is quite rare.

340
341
342
343
344
345

See supra notes 63–64.
See supra note 218.
See supra notes 321–31.
See supra Parts IV.A.2, 4.
See a summary of the patent medium’s characteristics in supra Table 1.
See supra notes 288–309.
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3. Rethinking First-to-File
The bulletin-board paradigm explains partially the communicative implications of the FTF reform, focusing on expediting publication. This Article argues that the network paradigm provides a
fuller explanation. Applying the element of different levels of access
(i.e., private and public spheres)346 maintains that the FTF rule is not
merely about the speed of patent communication but also about better quality and reliability of patent communication.
When discussing the levels of access element, this Article indicated how private channels—not only public ones—can affect patent communication. It now illustrates this point by reflecting upon
the FTF rule through the private-public spheres, with a focus on the
case of secret prior art.347 Under the FTI concept, an applicant was
not entitled to a patent if the pertinent invention was already accomplished by another.348 This exclusion is inherent to the FTI concept,
maintaining that the person eligible for a patent is the first to invent
it. This situation led to an odd state of secret prior art:349 Applicants
could not know, in principle, whether there is prior art—in the form
of an invention in the possession of a first inventor—that blocks
their patent application, as such prior art is discreet.350 Secret prior
art impaired the trust and reliability of available prior art as it may
not reflect reality, and more generally, prevented the patent medium
from communicating the actual state-of-art.
Secret prior art is a particular case that emphasizes the possible
detrimental effects of a private channel on patent communication in
346

See supra Part IV.B.3.
When using “secret prior art,” this Article refers to non-pending prior inventions and
not the on-sale bar to prior art. See Pre-AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)–(g); Helsinn Healthcare
S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
348 Activities under section 102(g)(2) do not count as prior art if the invention was
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed. Indeed, that was a key exception to the first-toinvent: the second-to-invent could get the patent because the first to invent disqualified
herself by abandoning, suppressing, or concealing the invention. This mitigates concerns
over secret prior art to some extent (though it may be secret when created). See Pre-AIA,
35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
349
Another meaning of secret prior art is the knowledge found in pending patent
applications, yet to be published. The discussion here, though, does not address this case.
350
See C. Douglass Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 147, 150–51 (1996) (“[Secret prior art in the form of prior inventions of
others] is inherent in a first-to-invent system.”).
347
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general, as the network paradigm suggests. The secret prior art issue
involves damage in terms of communication quality and reliability
within the patent medium. The FTF rule solved, or at least significantly restricted,351 the problem of secret prior art by simply dictating that the first inventor to file is the person eligible for a patent,
regardless of any potential previous secret inventions.
Note that even under the FTF rule, there are some semi-discreet
uses of an invention that are not known to the world at large but
transpire as prior art;352 still, the FTF rule mitigated dramatically the
scope of secret prior art.353 Consequently, the FTF reform enhanced
not only the speed but also the quality of patent communication.
CONCLUSION
The patent system is not just a platform for monetizing inventions or disseminating legal and technical information; it is an arena
of communication—a medium. The patent medium enables participants to converse with each other in various and unique ways.
This Article argued that the present, implicit mindset toward the
patent medium perceives of patent communication as linear and informative, consisting of few participants, with a particular focus on
senders. This approach—defined here as the bulletin-board paradigm—covers patent communication only partially and fails to offer
explanations for a variety of phenomena in patent law. Instead, this
Article suggests adopting an alternative, transactional paradigm—
the network paradigm. The network paradigm depicts patent communication as a continuous game, with multiple players, allowing
messages to flow in many directions and under different levels of
access. Importantly, instead of merely informing, the network paradigm suggests that the patent medium allows for a discourse.
The network paradigm’s implications are tremendous, as
demonstrated through the discussion of three sample phenomena.

351

See supra notes 347, 349; Thomas, supra note 350, at 168 (“The novelty-only
approach used by most countries together with a first-to-file system reduces this problem
significantly.”).
352 See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1364.
353
See Thomas, supra note 350, at 168.
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Indeed, this paradigm offers useful explanatory power that we can
apply to better comprehend the patent system and its participants.
Hence, this Article encourages scholars to apply the network paradigm to inspect other patent-related phenomena. Such implementation of the new paradigm will both deepen our understanding of patent law and scrutinize the network paradigm’s potential and limitations.
Another, more general direction for future research is the interplay of law and communication. Beyond the narrow context of patent law, this Article indirectly raises more fundamental questions:
what can we attain by thinking of and treating legal systems as a
medium? What insights we can draw from the patent medium case
to the broader law-communication context? Investigating these
questions will benefit our understanding of not only patent communication but also the interface between law and communication in
the broader sense.

